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I. INTRODUCTION
As the public increasingly invests in the securities markets - either
directly or indirectly through Mutual Funds, IRAs, Keogh plans and
other pension devices' - litigation between the securities industry and
its customers has mushroomed and become more complex. These
disputes number in the thousands every year, and are expected to rise
still further in the future as a result of increased volume and expanded
electronic trading.2 Their resolution is largely being channeled into
arbitration or submitted to mediation with greater frequency, principally
at forums provided by the various self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 3 Arbitration and mediation
traditionally provide the advantage of a speedy resolution of securities
disputes by persons knowledgeable in the area, without excessive costs.
Unless, however, such procedures are fair both in fact and in
appearance, their popularity as a means of settling securities disputes
will greatly diminish, especially if the public is restricted to resolving
such disputes before SRO forums.
To better understand the present rules governing such arbitrations
and mediations, we must look to the development of the present system
1. See William J. Holstein et al., Can the Fed Santa Save Christmas?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Dec. 18, 2000, at 40 ("Nearly half of U.S. households now have some
stake in the market through mutual funds, pension funds, 401(k)s, or direct equity
holdings.").
2. See Anne Kates Smith, Champion of the Investor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 11, 2000, at 78; Michael Schroeder & Rebecca Buckman, SEC Chief Wants Online
Trading Firms to Disclose the Rules of Internet Dealing, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1999, at
C23; see also Richard Karp, Dueling for Dollars, BARRON'S, Nov. 16, 1998, at 24; Saul
Hansell, New Breeds of Investors, All Beguiled by the Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999,
§ 3, at 1; C. Evan Stewart, The Securities Industry in the 21st Century, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
16, 1999, at 5; Charles Gasparino & Rebecca Buckman, Horning In: Facing Internet
Threat, Merrill To Offer Trading Online For Low Fees, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1999, at
Al; Pat Wechsler, It's 8P.M., and Mom's Out Trading, Bus. WK., June 14, 1999, at 44;
Macroscope, A Nation of Shareholders?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, June 21, 1999, at A4;
Anne Kates Smith, Roads to Riches, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 1999, at 66.
3. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 279 (1984) [hereinafter Katsoris I]. See generally Thomas J.
Stipanowich, ADR and 'The Vanishing Trial' What We Know - and What We Don 't, 10
DiSp. RESOL. MAG. No. 4, at 7 (Summer 2004).
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and explore the judicial developments that have directed most of such
disputes into SRO forums.4 In addition, we must also examine
legislative attempts to alter or influence this area of dispute resolution,5
as well as the establishment and work of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA), and the oversight role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission).6 Finally,
we must inquire whether the rules governing securities arbitration and
mediation at the SRO forums (or other alternative providers) insure a
level playing field for the participants.
II. BACKGROUND OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION
The arbitration of securities disputes can be traced back to the
NYSE in 1872.' Thereafter, numerous other SROs have also established
arbitration programs for the settlement of such disputes.
A. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
An unresolved dispute between an investor and his or her broker
ordinarily winds up in arbitration because of a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement entered into at the time a customer opens a brokerage
account. 9 Indeed, such agreements are widespread, particularly in the
case of margin, option, or other accounts involving credit.10 Under the
United States Arbitration Act (Federal Arbitration Act or Arbitration
Act), agreements to arbitrate future disputes are generally specifically
enforceable."1 An exception to this mandate, however, was carved out in
4. See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
7. P. Hoblin, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, Case 1-2
(1988).
8. Id.; see Deborah Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, Securities Arbitration at Self-
Regulatory Organizations: NYSE and NASD Administration and Procedures, 949
PLI/CORP. 99, at 106 (Jul. - Aug. 1996).
9. See Katsoris I, supra note 3, at 292.
10. See Ann C. Stansbury & Justin P. Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker
Disputes: A Summary of Development, 35 ARB. J. 30, 32 (1980); see also C. Fletcher,
Dynamism in Securities Arbitration, SEC. ARB. PRAC. & PROC. SEM. 14 (1989).
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: "[A] written
provision in. .. a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
2006] 417
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1954 by the United States Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan,12 which was
faced with the Hobson's choice between the mandate of the Arbitration
Act to arbitrate, and provisions in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 or
Securities Act) intended to protect customers' rights. After expressing
some mistrust of arbitration, the Court in Wilko concluded that
Congress' desire to protect investors would be more effectively served
by holding unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements relating to
issues arising under the 1933 Act. 3
Subsequently, most federal courts presumed that the Wilko
exception for 1933 Act claims also extended to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act or Exchange Act), and thus refused to compel
arbitration for customers' claims arising under the 1934 Act, despite the
presence of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 14  This became even
more problematic when a public customer joined a non-arbitrable Wilko
federal claim with an arbitrable non-federal securities claim. Some
courts bifurcated the two and ordered that the federal Wilko claim be
litigated, and the non-federal claim be arbitrated.' 5  Other courts,
however, found that if the two claims were so intertwined that it was
impractical or impossible to separate them, both claims should be
litigated together. 6
The intertwining/bifurcation dilemma was settled by the Supreme
Court in 1985 in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,17 which held that
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.") (emphasis added). Because the Federal Arbitration Act
applies to claims arising from transactions involving interstate commerce, and because
securities dealings usually involve such transactions, state securities claims, as well as
those arising under the federal securities laws, are usually arbitrable. See Katsoris I,
supra note 3, at 292.
12. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
13. Id. at 438.
14. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 366-67 (1988) [hereinafter Katsoris II]; but see Katsoris 1,
supra note 3, at 301-02 ("Thus, although Scherk involved a lob-5 claim arising out of
an international securities transaction, the Court's suggestion that the Wilko prohibition
be limited to 1933 Act claims should be followed in domestic cases as well.") (emphasis
added) (citing Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974)).
15. See Katsoris II, supra note 14, at 366.
16. Id. at 366-67.
17. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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when an arbitrable claim is joined with a non-arbitrable Wilko claim,
the claims need not be tried together involuntarily. Although Byrd was
silent as to whether the Wilko exemption applied to 1934 Act claims, it
rejected the concept of "intertwining," and supported the principle of
automatic bifurcation whenever a non-arbitrable Wilko claim is joined
with an arbitrable claim."8 In other words, the two claims could be tried
separately and simultaneously. 9 Whatever the merits of automatic
bifurcation, it would unleash and set in motion two separate forums on a
potential collision course.2°
Fortunately, this potential trauma of forum confrontation did not
last for long. Shortly after the Byrd decision, the Supreme Court in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,2' cleared up prior
misconceptions by holding that the Wilko exemption did not apply to
1934 Act claims. Moreover, soon thereafter, the Supreme Court in
Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 22 undid the
Wilko exception entirely and held that pre-dispute arbitration agreements
would be upheld, even as to issues arising under the 1933 Act.23
Accordingly, with the Wilko barrier removed by McMahon and
Rodriguez, most securities disputes are now arbitrated at SRO forums
pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration agreements.24
In the aftermath of the McMahon decision, both Congress and the
legislatures of several states attempted to render pre-dispute securities
arbitration agreements unenforceable.25 Such efforts, however, have
18. Id. at 217.
19. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 8-11 (1986) [hereinafter Katsoris III] (The essence of the
problem is that two separate forums would often be ruling essentially on the same set of
facts with the possibility of contradictory findings.).
20. Id.
21. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
22. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
23. See Arbitration and the Demise of Wilko v. Swan, N.Y. L.J., June 15, 1989, at
3.
24. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 483, 487 (1996) [hereinafter Katsoris IV].
25. See Draft Bill To Restrict Use of Pre-Dispute Agreements, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, June 1988, at 4; Markey to SEC: What Happened?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, July 1988, at 1; State Actions on Pre-Dispute Clauses, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Aug. 1988, at 9.
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generally proven unsuccessful.26
B. CREATION OF SICA /ROLE OF THE SEC
Prior to 1976, most SROs had differing rules for the administration
of securities arbitration disputes.27 In June 1976, the SEC solicited
comments from interested persons on the feasibility of developing a
"uniform system of dispute grievance procedures for the adjudication of
small claims. 28 After conducting a public forum at which written and
oral comments were received, the SEC's Office of Consumer Affairs
issued a report recommending the adoption of procedures for handling
investor disputes and the creation of a new entity to administer the
system.
29
Before implementing the proposal for a new arbitration forum, the
Commission invited further public comment.3 In response to this
invitation, several SROs proposed the establishment of a securities
industry task force to consider the development of "a uniform arbitration
code and the means for establishing a more efficient, economic and
appropriate mechanism for resolving investor disputes involving small
sums of money."'" As a result of this suggestion, the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA) was established in April 1977,
consisting of representatives of various SROs, 32 the Securities Industry
26. See S. Hinden, GAO Asked To Investigate Securities Arbitration Issues, WASH.
POST, Feb. 7, 1990, at 2; Markey to SEC: What Happened?, supra.note 25, at 1;
Securities Indus. Ass 'n v. Connolly - Massachusetts Arbitration Rules Preempted, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, Aug. 1989, at 2. See also Section IV Alternatives to SRO
Arbitration, infra notes 284-311 and accompanying text.
27. Katsoris I, supra note 3, at 283.
28. Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,528 at 2 (June 9, 1976), 9 SEC Docket 833, at 834 (Mar.
-July 1976).
29. An Integrated Nationwide System for the Resolution of Investor Disputes,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,974 at 1-2 (Nov. 15, 1976), 10 SEC Docket 955, at 955-
56 (July - Dec. 1976).
30. Id.
31. FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 2
(Apr. 1986) (on file with author) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT].
32. The following SROs were represented: the American (ASE), Boston (BSE),
Cincinnati (CSE), Midwest (MSE), New York (NYSE), Pacific (PSE), and Philadelphia
(PHSE) Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and the National Association of
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Association (SIA)33 and the public.34
The Commission then invited proposals from SICA to improve the
methods for resolution of investors' small claims.35 After holding
numerous meetings throughout the country, SICA developed a
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. After 1997,
the MRSB would not accept new arbitration claims, after which the NASD would
assume responsibility for the arbitration of municipal securities disputes. See MSRB
Turns to NASD Arbitration to Handle Municipal Securities Disputes, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1997, at 5. In 1998, the ASE agreed to merge with the NASD.
See Philadelphia Stock Exchange Proposal to End its Arbitration Program Approved by
SEC, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1998, at 10. After September 1998, the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange no longer accepted new arbitration claims for filing.
Instead, members thereafter become subject to the NASD Code, and were obliged to
abide by that Code, as if they were NASD members. Id.
33. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. The SIA is a trade association for the
securities industry.
34. See TENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION 1 (June 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter TENTH REPORT]. Peter R.
Cella, Jr., Esq., Mortimer Goodman, Esq., and the author served as The Public
Members of SICA at its creation in 1977. Id. at 3. In 1983, Justin Klein, Esq. was
added as the fourth Public Member of SICA. Id. Commencing on December 31, 1989,
the then current public members' terms would expire, one a year, and were then each
eligible for reappointment for one new four-year term. All new members will serve for
four years and are eligible for reappointment to one additional four-year term. The
public members whose terms are not expiring will determine the appointment of new
members or their reappointment. The appointment, or reappointment, may be vetoed by
a two-thirds vote of the non-public members of SICA. Id. Mortimer Goodman
concluded his term in 1990 and was replaced by James E. Beckley, a sole practitioner
from Wheaton, Illinois. In 1995, Justin P. Klein concluded his term and was replaced
by Thomas R. Grady of Grady & Associates, Naples, Florida. After nineteen years of
service, Peter R. Cella concluded his term in 1996 and was replaced by Thomas J.
Stipanowich. Professor Stipanowich was reappointed to serve a second term. In 1997,
after twenty years of service, the author concluded his term as a Public Member and the
public membership returned to three. In 1998, James E. Beckley concluded his term
and was replaced by Theodore Eppenstein, of Eppenstein and Eppenstein, New York,
New York. Mr. Eppenstein was reappointed in 2002. In 2000, Mr. Grady was
reappointed to a second term and concluded his term on the Conference in 2003. Mr.
Grady was replaced by the author who returned to active status and Chair of SICA
meetings. Upon the expiration of the term of Professor Stipanowich in 2004, he was
replaced in 2005 by Pat Sadler, an attorney from Atlanta, Georgia.
35. See Implementation of an Investor Dispute System, Exchange Act Release No.
13,470 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 81,136, at 83,905 (Apr.
26, 1977).
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simplified arbitration procedure for resolving customer claims of $2,500
or less,36 and issued an informational booklet describing small claims
procedures (Small Claims Booklet).37 Realizing, however, that the
development of a small claims procedure was only a first step, SICA
then developed a comprehensive Uniform Code of Arbitration (Uniform
Code or Code) for the securities industry.38 The Code established a
uniform system of arbitration procedures to cover all claims by
investors.39 In addition, SICA prepared an explanatory booklet for
prospective claimants (Procedures Booklet),4" explaining procedures
under the Code. To a large extent, the Code incorporated and
harmonized the rules of the various SROs and codified various
procedures that the SROs had previously informally followed, but had
not officially included in their existing rules.4 '
The original Code was adopted by the participating SROs during
1979 and 1980.42 Between the time of its initial adoption and the
McMahon case, various revisions were made to both the Code and the
36. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. SICA subsequently raised the
jurisdictional limit of small claims to $5,000 then $10,000 and then again to the present
$25,000. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 3.
37. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Exhibit D (Nov. 1977) (on file with
author) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
38. See UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION (Sec. Indus. Conference on Arbitration 1984),
reprinted in FOURTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION Exhibit C (Nov. 1984) (on file with author) [hereinafter FOURTH
REPORT].
39. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 2.
40. See THIRD REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 5 (Jan. 1980) (on file
with author) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT]; see also SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE
ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (2001), http://www.nasd.com/ (follow
"Arbitration & Mediation" hyperlink; then follow "Arbitration" hyperlink; then follow
"Arbitration Procedures" hyperlink) [hereinafter PROCEDURES BOOKLET]. After
McMahon, SICA consolidated the Small Claims booklet into the PROCEDURES
BOOKLET. See SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION 3 (Aug. 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT].
41. Katsoris I, supra note 3, at 284.
42. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 4. Once SICA adopts a new rule, each
SRO must then generally go back to their respective organization in order to get a rule
change which is then usually submitted to the SEC for approval. Accordingly, there is
often a time lag between SICA approval and SRO action.
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Procedures Booklet.43 With the significant influx of additional and often
more complex cases resulting from the McMahon decision,4 numerous
issues that previously had only been discussed at SICA (when SRO
arbitrations were largely voluntary) were reconsidered (for example:
expanded discovery procedures; selection, qualification, background
disclosures, training and evaluation of arbitrators; method of
transcribing and preserving the record of arbitration hearings; and, the
burdens placed upon SROs resulting from the anticipated increase in
case loads). Although some of the resultant changes nudged SRO
arbitration somewhat closer to litigation, these changes were thought
necessary in order to prevent trial by surprise and ambush.
To be effective, enduring, and fair, however, rules cannot be cast in
stone. Accordingly, SICA continues to meet in order to monitor the
actual performance of the Code, with a view towards further fine-tuning
and adjusting its provisions, as the need arises.45 Not only does the SEC
regularly attend these meetings, but other organizations such as the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), and the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) are regularly invited and often
attend.46 In addition, the emeriti public members whose terms have
expired are also invited and regularly attend.
To date, over one hundred forty thousand cases, including small
claims, have been filed with the participating SROs since the initial
approval of the Code.47 Moreover, since the SEC indicated that the
future amendments to SRO codes be made in plain English, SICA
translated the entire Uniform Code into "Plain English; ' and, on
43. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-6.
44. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 40, at 4. In the year before McMahon, 2,837
cases were filed at the various SROs, whereas in the year following McMahon, that
figure more than doubled to 6,097 cases filed.
45. See Katsoris II, supra note 14, at 364.
46. Id.
47. The bulk of said arbitrations are handled before the NASD and the NYSE. See
TWELFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 33, 39,
40 (Oct. 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter TWELFTH REPORT]. A composite
compilation of the arbitrations and/or mediations handled by the arbitration facilities of
the various SROs is attached hereto as Appendices B and C.
48. The SEC indicated that future amendments to the Uniform Code be made in
"Plain English." Through a research project sponsored by the Fordham University
School of Law, a draft of the entire Uniform Code was prepared in "Plain English" and
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January 18, 2001, replaced the original Code with the translated version.
In discussing the numerous and myriad issues involved in
navigating today's terrain on securities arbitration, it would appear that
tracking the SICA Code would be a logical starting point, in that it
breaks down most of the issues in an organized and orderly fashion. To
the extent other issues arise, they will, where practicable, be integrated
and discussed through the eyes of the Code; otherwise, they will be
discussed separately and independently.
III. THE SICA CODE
The Uniform Code of Arbitration originally consisted of thirty-one
sections ("Original Code") and was amended many times over the years,
particularly after the McMahon decision. On January 18, 2001, the
Code as it then existed ("Old Code") was replaced by a translated "Plain
English" version ("New Code"). In so translating the Old Code, the
original sections were often shifted and/or consolidated, so that the
current version of the New Code consists of only twenty-seven
sections.49 In tracking the development of the SICA Code (since its
adoption over twenty-five years ago) we will generally refer to the
twenty-seven sections of the New or present Code (which didn't exist
until January 18, 2001) rather than the thirty-one sections of the Old
submitted to SICA for its consideration. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 5. See
also ABA Satellite Seminar, "Plain English" in Plain English: A Practical Workshop
on How to Create Clear Disclosure Documents Under The SEC's Plain English Rule,
Sept. 15, 1998, at 19; Stephen I. Glover & Lawrence R. Baid, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1998,
at 5. The "Plain English" rules are set forth primarily in rules 421 and 461 of
Regulation C under the Securities Act of 1933, and items 501, 502, 503, and 508 of
Regulation S-K. New Rule 421 (d) requires issuers to draft the front and back, the cover
pages, the summary, and the risk factors section in "Plain English." The rules set forth
six "Plain English" principles. The issuer must "substantially" comply with each of
these principles: (1) short sentences; (2) definite, concrete, everyday language; (3) the
active, rather than the passive, voice; (4) tabular presentation or "bullet lists" for
complex information whenever possible; (5) no legal jargon or highly technical
business terms; and (6) no multiple negatives. Securities Act Rule 421 (d)(2) (17 CFR §
240.421 (d)(2)).
49. A copy of the present SICA Code is attached hereto as appendix A. Moreover,
both versions of the Code [the old version as it existed on January 19, 2001 and the new
version which replaced it on that date] appear side by side for purposes of comparison
at 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 307, 381-418 (2001) (hereinafter Katsoris X). See
also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Code. Accordingly, all references to the Code in this article refer to the
New or present Code unless otherwise indicated. In analyzing its
provisions, we will generally follow the order of the Code; however,
from time to time, we will digress from that pattern, sometimes
substituting or changing headings, and occasionally leapfrogging back
and forward to related sections, so the discussion will be more orderly
and cohesive.
A. JURISDICTION
Section 1 of the Code delineates the jurisdictional boundaries of
SRO arbitration, which permits an SRO to accept a matter upon the
demand of a customer or nonmember, even absent an agreement. On the
other hand, it also recognizes an SRO's basic right to decline the use of
its facilities where the dispute, claim, or controversy is not a proper
subject matter for arbitration.°
1. Application of the Code
Section 2 incorporates the Code by reference into every duly
executed Submission Agreement, which shall be binding on all parties.
It also extends the automatic incorporation of the Code to agreements to
arbitrate, thus insuring that a party to such an agreement who does not
sign a Submission Agreement is nevertheless still bound by the
provisions of the Uniform Code.
2. Industry Obligation to Arbitrate
SRO rules require that their membership consent to arbitrate
disputes upon the demand of their customers.5' By belonging to the
SRO, its members agree to be bound by the SRO's rules. Consequently,
customers of an SRO may compel a member of an SRO to arbitrate even
without a written agreement to arbitrate. Absent a written contract,
however, the member cannot compel the customer to arbitrate. 2
50. See UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION § 1 (b) (Sec. Indus. Conference on Arbitration
2005), infra app. A [hereinafter UNIF. CODE].
51. See Hoblin, supra note 7, at 2-3 to 2-4. See also UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, §
1.
52. Id.
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3. Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Customers are generally not required to arbitrate their disputes with
the securities industry absent a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Such
agreements, however, have become common and widespread. 3 After
the McMahon decision, section 3 was added to the Code (section 31 of
the Old Code) in order to insure that customers are aware and
understand the effect of signing an agreement containing a pre-dispute
arbitration clause.54 It provides that any pre-dispute arbitration clause in
agreements with customers must be highlighted and immediately
preceded by certain disclosure language that describes arbitration and its
effect. 5
Section 3 further provides that, immediately preceding the signature
line, there shall be a statement which shall be highlighted and separately
initialed by the customer that the agreement contains a pre-dispute
arbitration clause.16 Unfortunately, none of the SROs have incorporated
this separate initialing requirement into their arbitration rules,
apparently on the ground that it would cause an administrative burden. 7
This is regrettable, because from the point of view of both the customer
and the broker, such separate initialing would more clearly call the
arbitration clause to the customer's attention, and thus more likely
reduce the need for litigation based upon the customer's alleged lack of
awareness of the clause5 8
Finally, in order to prevent the insertion of restrictive clauses in
customers' agreements which would conflict with, or render ineffective
various provisions of the Code, section 3(d) also specifically prohibits
conditions that limit or contradict the rules of the SROs, or limit the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration, or limit the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award. 9
53. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (as to customers, this usually occurs
when they open an account); Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration
or Transfer (as to employees, when they sign a U-4 form); but see infra notes 62-73 and
accompanying text.
54. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 40, at 12.
55. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 3(b).
56. Id.
57. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 520. For other examples of deviations from
the Uniform Code, see infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
58. Id.
59. Since this section was inserted after McMahon, it included a grandfather clause,
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4. Class Actions
The Uniform Code specifically prohibits the submission of a claim
as a class action, because SICA felt that SRO forums, for a variety of
reasons, are not the proper venue for the resolution of such claims.60
This prohibition of class actions, however, has no effect upon the
consolidation or joinder of claims, which is specifically permitted by
section 8 of the Code. Furthermore, the Code permits claimants to join
in a class action pending in Court, despite an agreement to arbitrate; but
the claimants may file such claims in arbitration only if they have
elected not to participate in or have withdrawn from the class action.61
5. Employment Cases
Many employees in the securities industry were often required to
enter into an agreement that, should a dispute arise in the course of their
employment, it will be arbitrated before a specific SRO forum.62 In
1991, the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,63
held that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 196764 could be subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration provision in a securities registration form known as a Form
which provides that the requirements of the section would apply only to new
agreements signed, by an existing or new customer, after one year has elapsed from the
date of SEC approval to the rule (September 1989). Thus, a broker-dealer who
thereafter attempts to contractually limit an arbitrator's authority to award punitive
damages, or a customer's right to select any of the available SROs, may be subject to
disciplinary action by any SRO that has adopted this provision of which it is a member.
Indeed, both the NASD and the NYSE subsequently issued joint notices [Information
Memo/Notice to Members 95-16] to their members that they may not include or seek to
enforce provisions in customer agreements which can be construed as restricting or
limiting the ability of customers to arbitrate or arbitrators' powers to issue awards.
60. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § l(d)(1).
61. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § l(d)(3); see also Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, will the Class Action Survive?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2000).
62. Employees who deal with the public (i.e., brokers, investment executives, etc.)
are required to register with each SRO that their firm is a member of by signing a U-4
(Uniform Registration and Transfer) Form.
63. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
64. 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 etseq.
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U-4.65 Gilmer did not decide, however, whether its analysis applied to
arbitration provisions in all employment contracts, or what contracts of
employment are subject to the FAA.66 Accordingly, a number of courts
distanced themselves from mandatory arbitration of discrimination
claims.67
In any event, having employment discrimination claims tried at
SRO forums before arbitrators who were largely inexperienced as to
such claims raised much concern and consternation.68 One lower federal
court went so far as to contend that the SRO forum involved was not an
adequate forum due to what the district court referred to as a "structural
bias in favor of the industry., 69 In an attempt to diffuse this politically
sensitive issue, some firms voluntarily agreed not to enforce such
arbitration obligations against their employees.70  Furthermore, the
NASD dropped its requirement in the U-4 employment agreement
binding employees to arbitrate discrimination claims; however, this does
not prohibit arbitration of other claims, nor does it prohibit firms from
separately inserting arbitration agreements in employment contracts. 7'
65. See also note 53 and accompanying text.
66. See Peter N. Hillman & Bernard W. McCarthy, Mandatory Arbitration
Provisions Enforceable?; U.S. Supreme Court Has Not Yet Addressed All Factual
Situations, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at S7.
67. See Evan J. Charkes, Recent Court Decisions Demonstrate That Mandatory
Arbitration Is Waning, N.Y. L.J., April 27, 1999, at 1; see also U.S. Circuits Split on
FAA's Explanation of Employment Cases, DIsP. RESOL., Spring 1999, at 26; Seus v.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1139
(1999).
68. See Political Pressure Increases to Curb Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, May 1997, at 9.
69. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190
(D. Mass. 1997). Although the Court of Appeals in Rosenberg agreed with the district
court that the motion to compel was properly denied on the facts, it disagreed with the
lower court's contention of structural bias at the SROforum. 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1999).
70. See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 5 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Diane E. Lewis, Women
Get Day In Court, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1999, at G4; Political Pressure Increases
to Curb Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
May 1997, at 9. But see SIA Expresses Vigorous Support for Continuing Arbitration,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, May 1997, at 9.
71. See NASD Proposes Eliminating Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1997, at 11. See also NASD
Files New Rules for Handling Employment Discrimination Disputes, SEC. ARB.
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On the other hand, the New York Stock Exchange announced that it
would not accept employment discrimination claims unless the parties
agreed to arbitrate after the dispute arose.72 Thus, it would appear that
the future of mandatory arbitration of employment claims at SRO
forums is somewhat clouded.73
6. Six Year Eligibility Rule
From its inception the Uniform Code established a six year
limitation for the submission of a claim to arbitrate ("Six Year Rule" or
"Eligibility Rule"), starting from the time of the occurrence or event
giving rise to the claim.7 4 This Six Year Rule, however, does not extend
applicable statutes of limitation, and was inserted as a matter of
administrative convenience at a time when: (i) arbitration was basically
voluntary on the public's part; (ii) there were no formal discovery rules;
and (iii) limited partnerships, which were the subject of much litigation
in the late 1980s, were not contemplated.7 5 It was never the intent of
SICA to invalidate claims by this rule, but merely to articulate that
claims over six years old could not be submitted to an SRO forum for
arbitration.76
COMMENTATOR, May 1999, at 7; SEC Approves PCX Pullback from Employment
Arbitration, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, May 1999, at 7.
72. See NYSE Proposes End to Employment Discrimination Arbitration Absent
Post-Dispute Agreement, SEC ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1998, at 8; see also SEC
Approves PCX Pullback From Employment Arbitration, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
May 1999, at 7.
73. See Charkes, supra note 67, at 1. See also Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001); Colin P. Johnson, Has Arbitration Become A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing?: A
Comment Exploring The Incompatibility Between Pre-Dispute Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Agreements In Employment Contracts and Statutorily Created Rights, 23
HAMLINE L. REv 511 (Spring, 2000); Michael Bobelian, Employees Raise Concerns
About High Costs of Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 2004, at 1; Discrimination Claims
& Arbitration Fees, SEC. ARB. ALERT, 2005-49, Dec. 22, 2005, at I (On October 24,
2005, the SEC approved a new fee schedule for brokerage employees filing statutory
discrimination claims with NASD Arbitration, which effectively charges all but $200 to
the employing broker-dealer). See also Robert Clemente, Securities Industry
Arbitration Employment Disputes: A (former) Insider's Perspective, THE N.Y. EMP.
ADVOC., Vol. 12, No. 4, Feb. 2004, at 6.
74. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 12(a).
75. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 493.
76. Id. See also Barry Temkin, Statutes of Limitations in Securities Arbitration,
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Unfortunately, this Rule inadvertently and needlessly complicated
the arbitration process. Some courts misinterpreted the Six Year Rule as
barring such claims altogether. Furthermore, various courts differed as
to who should decide the threshold issue of eligibility - the courts or
the arbitrators.77 The AAA had no similar provision, despite securities
industry involvement in the development of its securities arbitration
rules.7' This is perhaps one of the reasons brokerage firms did not
include the AAA as an alternative forum to the SROs in their arbitration
agreements.7 9 For these and other reasons, elimination of the Six Year
Rule from the SICA Code has been suggested by the author, and
subsequently endorsed by the Ruder Report. 80
Instead of eliminating the Eligibility Rule, however, SICA amended
section 12 of the Code (section 4 of the Old Code) to provide that all
claims are considered eligible unless a challenge to eligibility is made to
the SRO's Director of Arbitration (within twenty business days of the
service of the Statement of Claim), and the Director's decision with
respect to such eligibility is final and may only be challenged in court
within 20 business days of service of the Director's decision." The
amendment further clarified that allegations of fraudulent concealment
would not render otherwise stale claims eligible by defining "occurrence
or event" as the trade date, or (if the claim does not arise from a trade)
the date the respondent engaged in or omitted from engaging in the
activity that is the subject of the claim.82  It was also specifically
provided that claims so determined to be ineligible for arbitration could
be filed in court as if no arbitration agreement existed.83
B. SMALL CLAIMS / SIMPLIFIED ARBITRATION
Section 9 of the Code (section 2 of the Old Code) deals with
N.Y. L.J., June 16, 2005, at 4.
77. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 493.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 494; see also infra notes 302-06 and accompanying text (discussing
SICA's pilot program).
80. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 494. See also infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
81. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 4-5.
82. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 12(d).
83. Id.
ROADMAP TO SECURITIES ADR
Simplified Arbitration procedures, so that small claims can be resolved
more quickly and at less expense than larger claims - otherwise the
cost to arbitrate could often exceed any potential recovery. Initially its
provisions applied to disputes where the dollar amount in controversy
did not exceed $2,500; and, over the years, that amount has been
gradually raised to the present ceiling of $25,000.84
Although the provisions of section 9 are geared to providing small
claimants with the opportunity of resolving their claim in a more
expeditious and less costly manner, many procedural safeguards of the
Code - i.e., pre-hearing discovery procedures and the method of
selection of arbitrators - remain available to the small claimant.85
C. REQUIREMENT OF HEARING
The Uniform Code provides (except in the case of Small Claims)
that all disputes, claims or controversies shall require a hearing unless all
parties have waived such a hearing in writing and request the matter be
resolved solely upon the pleadings and documentary evidence.86
Nevertheless, despite such a waiver by the parties, a majority of the
arbitrators may call for and conduct such a hearing.87 In addition, any
arbitrator may request the submission of further evidence.88
D. DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS
The Uniform Code also provides that the arbitrators shall, upon the
joint request of the parties, dismiss the proceedings. 89 Furthermore, the
arbitrators may, on their own initiative, or at the request of a party,
dismiss the proceedings and refer the parties to their judicial remedies or
to any other dispute resolution forum agreed to by the parties without
prejudice to any claim or defenses available to any party, or other
remedies provided by law. 90 This section also specifically authorizes the
arbitrators to dismiss a claim, defense or proceeding with prejudice as a
84. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 3.
85. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 9(i).
86. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 10.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 22(c).
90. Id. § 22(a).
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sanction for willful and intentional failure to comply with an order of the
arbitrator(s) if lesser sanctions have proven ineffective. 91 As a matter of
practice, however, arbitrators generally do not dismiss a matter before
the first hearing, often preferring to hear part or all of the case before
doing so, particularly in pro se cases.9
E. SETTLEMENTS
Section 14 of the Code simply provides that parties to an arbitration
"may agree to settle their dispute at any time." 93 In 1993, however, the
NASD sua sponte filed with the SEC a Rule 19(b) filing that would have
established, for a two year trial period, a formal procedure for parties (in
arbitration proceedings involving at least $250,000 in total damages) to
make pre-hearing settlement offers (Offer of Award Rule).94 It would
have required parties who rejected such settlement offers to pay the
offering party's reasonable costs (including expert witness and attorneys
fees) incurred after the offer was made, if the award granted in the
ensuing arbitration was not more favorable to the rejecting party than
the settlement offer.95
Although this proposal would seemingly encourage the settlement
of large and costly disputes, it was the unanimous conclusion of the
Public Members of SICA and most of the SROs that, on balance, such a
rule change would have a coercive effect upon public claimants to
accept a settlement offer rather than risk being assessed with the
excessive costs and attorneys fees of the offering party.96 In addition,
since the threshold sum of $250,000 included punitive damages, the
proposed rule would also have had the additional effect of compelling
claimants to reduce or eliminate a punitive damage claim so as to avoid
crossing the threshold and thereby being subjected to the penalties of the
91. Id. § 22(b).
92. See Constantine N. Katsoris, An Arbitrator's Perspective, PLI/SEC. ARB.:
Redefining Practices and Techniques, vol. 1, at 307 (1998) [hereinafter Katsoris V].
93. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 14; see also David E. Robbins, How To Settle
A Case, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 1999, at 1.
94. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 496; see also Exchange Act Release No.
33,081, 55 SEC Docket 620 (Oct. 20, 1993).
95. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 496.
96. Id.
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Offer of Award Rule.97 The NASD withdrew its Offer of Award Rule in
1994.9
F. TOLLING OF TIME LIMITATIONS
The Code also provides that Statutes of Limitation for the
institution of legal proceedings would be tolled (where permitted by
law) when a duly executed Submission Agreement was filed by the
claimant(s), and would continue to be tolled so long as the SRO retained
jurisdiction.99
Conversely, this section also provides that where the dispute, claim,
or controversy has been submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction,
the Six Year Eligibility Rule (preventing submission to arbitration) shall
be tolled for such period as the court shall retain jurisdiction over the
matter submitted.100
G. CLASSIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS
Although the Code always provided that the majority of the
arbitrators on any panel involving a public customer or non-member be
public arbitrators (i.e., not affiliated with the securities industry), no
further guidance was given by the original Code regarding who qualified
as a public arbitrator.10 1 The original version of the Procedures Booklet,
however, described public arbitrators as "individuals who are neither
associated with, nor employed by a broker-dealer or securities industry
organization.' 0 2  SICA initially left this test flexible so that the
experience of many needed and qualified persons would not be lost. As
time went on, however, it became apparent that the category of public
arbitrators had to be more clearly defined. Accordingly, Guidelines for
the Classification of Public Arbitrators were added to the Procedures
booklet.10 3
97. Id.
98. See Michael Scionolfi, NASD Withdraws 'Loser Pays' Arbitration Proposal,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 1994, at C1.
99. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 5(a).
100. Id. § 5(b).
101. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 498.
102. Id.
103. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Composition of SRO Panels?, SEC. ARB.
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After McMahon, however, SICA further tightened the classification
of public arbitrators by amending the Code to specifically exclude as
public arbitrators: (1) brokers and registered investment advisers and
persons who are retired from the securities industry; (2) persons who
had been employed in the industry in the past three years; (3)
professionals (i.e., attorneys or accountants) who devote 20% or more of
their work efforts to securities industry clients; and (4) spouses of
industry personnel.
10 4
In addition, section 16 of the new Code was subsequently amended
to further restrict those who could be classified as public arbitrators by
providing that an attorney, accountant or other professional whose firm
derives 20% or more of its annual income from securities industry
representation cannot be classified as a public arbitrator.'°5 Similarly,
an employee of a bank or financial institution engaged in or supervising
those engaged in effecting transactions in securities cannot be classified
a public arbitrator; 10 6 this definition was later expanded to also exclude
registered investment advisers.'0 7
Furthermore, the Code defines a securities arbitrator to include an
individual who is registered under the Commodities Exchange Act or is
a member of a registered futures association or any commodities
exchange or is associated with any such person(s).18
As is evident from the aforementioned discussion, the battle to
define who is an industry arbitrator and who is a public arbitrator has
been an ongoing struggle since the two classifications were first
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Katsoris VI].
104. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 498.
105. See Katsoris VI, supra note 103. In discussing the merits of such amendment,
one of the key issues for SICA was percentage-wise, how low to set the bar. Shortly
after SICA adopted the twenty percent threshold, the NASD unilaterally cut that
threshold in half to ten percent over a two year period. Regardless of the merits of
percentage disqualification, I respectfully suggest that a 10% threshold is too low
because it is largely unenforceable and will create too large a dragnet. As well
intentioned as the rule may be, I suspect that the net effect will be to cause
administrative discomfort for the SROs and cull from the ranks of public arbitrators
many knowledgeable and outstanding candidates of impeccable credentials and
integrity, at a time when SRO caseloads are exploding and the substance of the cases is
becoming more complicated and complex. Id.
106. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 16(e).
107. Id. § 16(d)(2).
108. Id. § 16(c)(1).
ROADMAP TO SECURITIES ADR
established by SICA over 25 years ago. Looming on the horizon,
however, is a related and more fundamental issue, namely suggestions
that the industry arbitrator classification be eliminated altogether,
leaving only a shrinking pool of public arbitrators on SRO panels. 09
Understandably, such an action will be viewed by the industry as an
attempt to "stack the deck" against it.
It should also be noted that the dual classification system was
established by SICA at a time when SRO arbitration was in its infancy
and basically a voluntary process; and it was in effect when the issue of
fairness of arbitration was raised before the Supreme Court in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon. Not insignificantly, over
one hundred forty thousand arbitrations have been filed under this dual
classification system at the various SROs since the enactment of the
SICA Code. During that time, I have participated as a public arbitrator
in scores of such cases; and, more recently, I have assisted in the
establishment of a securities resolution clinic at Fordham to represent
investors who found it difficult to obtain counsel. Absent isolated
complaints of conflicts or incompetence of arbitrators which surface
from time to time regarding both classifications, I have personally found
the overall competence and integrity of arbitrators to be excellent.
Although constantly improving the pool of arbitrators is and always
should be a priority, my feeling is that the present dual classification
system, together with the list selection procedure has, to date, brought a
balance to the process.
Nevertheless, no system is perfect and alternatives should be
explored, particularly since SRO arbitration is now mandatory and the
caseload has increased tenfold over the last twenty-five years. The time
may be ripe, therefore, to explore a more simplified system of arbitrator
selection to replace the present one that increasingly micro-manages 
1 o
109. See Katsoris VI, supra note 103, at 4; see also Susanne Craig, Wall Street
Panels for Settling Fights Draw Renewed Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at A1; see
also PIABA vs. Industry Arbitrator, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Nov. 2005, at 10.
110. Indeed, in applying a firm's industry representation disqualification rule for
public arbitrators (10% for NASD, 20% for SICA) the NASD will surely have to hire a
set of auditors just to monitor the process. See Katsoris VI, supra note 103. For
example:
In applying this percentage rule [SICA's 20% threshold], differences of opinion will
surely surface as to how to calculate income from securities industry representation.
For example, is drawing a lease of office space for the parent, subsidiary or major
shareholder of a brokerage firm considered industry representation? Similarly, what
20061
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the qualification guidelines between the public and industry - a system
which is making the SROs' management role increasingly difficult and,
at the same time, excludes many fine arbitrators from qualifying under
either classification."' Instead, perhaps the time has come to let the
lawyers do their lawyering. Accordingly, this author has for several
years suggested that the present system may no longer be practical, and
that the dual classification system be replaced by one all-inclusive pool
of qualified arbitrators, coupled with a potpourri of: list selection; a
reasonable number of preemptory challenges; and unlimited challenges
for cause." 2
is the effect of representing a brokerage firm together with several other unrelated
claimants or defendants in a non-securities matter? Are fees from representing a
broker against his or her firm considered income from securities industry
representation? Do the fees of mediators in securities disputes count, at least in part,
as securities industry representation? Moreover, how do you handle the dilemma
where, in the same year afirm receives 20% of its income from an industry client, it
also derives 25% of its income from representing third parties against the industry?
Another problem is the shifting landscape of one's practice, as it cuts across calendar
years. Suppose my firm's practice was 15% industry in 2003, 28% in 2004 and 12%
in 2005; and, I was appointed a public arbitrator on a long case late in 2003 that
unavoidably spanned three calendar years. Does my status change in 2004 or 2005?
In addition, what is the effect if an arbitrator miscalculates, and inadvertently sits on a
case as a public member, then renders a decision and subsequently discovers he has
violated the percentage guidelines. Can there be a challenge to the award?
There are also timing issues as to when and how much income is recognized. For
example, in calculating income percentages do we use the cash method, the accrual
method or some hybrid method? Moreover, are we interested in net or gross income;
or instead, in gross receipts (billable time plus disbursements) or net receipts (without
disbursements)?
Id.
111. Id. Moreover, it is interesting to note that in the last few years, the NASD (for
a variety of reasons) shrank its arbitrator pools from about 9,000 to about 6,340 -
3,692 of whom are Public and 2,646 of whom are Non-Public. NASD Arbitrators, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, Nov. 2005, at 12. Furthermore, "The 'Public' number will likely
be culled further, if the new 'affiliate' rules are approved." Id. Thus, if the industry
classification is eliminated, that will leave about 3,600 as qualified arbitrators to handle
the NASD's enormous caseload nationwide.
112. Id. See also Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing
Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, March 17,
2005 (Statement of Constantine Katsoris); see also Katsoris VI, supra note 103, at 104.
Interestingly, my suggestion to permanently eliminate the present public/industry
classifications (coupled with the safeguard of a generous number of peremptory
challenges) has spawned many hybrid look-alike proposals; however, don't always
judge a book by its cover. For example, one such proposal recently surfaced which on
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Finally, an interesting challenge to the qualification of SRO
arbitrators arose several years ago in the State of California when it
adopted its own stringent arbitration disclosure rules designed to prevent
conflicts of interest by arbitrators." 3 After failing to win an exemption
from such requirements, the NYSE and the NASD filed suit in federal
court in California contending that the California standards are
preempted by the national system of federal securities regulation;' 14 and,
both SROs stopped appointing arbitrators to California panels." 5  In
March of 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the application of the California standards to the SROs is
preempted by the Exchange Act and the comprehensive system of
federal regulation of the securities industry established pursuant to the
Exchange Act. 1 6 A similar result was reached two months later by the
its face superficially called for the elimination of the dual classification system, but then
proceeded to provide: for unlimited peremptory challenges; and, if a panel could not be
so constituted (which is highly likely because of the unlimited peremptories), the SRO
could then administratively appoint arbitrators from a newly created pool of super-
screened arbitrators, basically consisting of those who were never even remotely
connected with the industry either directly or indirectly. To carry this hybrid
philosophy to its extreme, one could similarly argue that a judge, who at one point in
their career had been a prosecutor, is presumptively unfit to sit on a criminal case.
113. See Pitt Rebukes NYSE, NASD Over Refusal to Empanel California Arbitrators,
34 SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 36, Sept. 16, 2002, at 1498.
114. Id. See also Application of California Arbitration Standards to SROs
Preempted, District Court Decides, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 18, May 5, 2003; Ann
Theresa Palmer, California Securities Arbitration at a Standstill, REGISTERED REP.,
Sept. 2002, at 9 ("'This is a serious issue,' says Constantine N. Katsoris, a law professor
at Fordham University and one of three of the original public members of the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration [SICA]. SICA was conceived 'with the SEC's
blessing.., to create a uniform set of rules for all exchanges so that we could have a
national securities market,' says Katsoris. 'You can't have different people getting
different relief depending on which state they're in."').
115. Palmer, supra note 114.
116. See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th
Cir. 2005); see also M. Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities
Arbitrations,
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/medarb/documents/mediationarbitration/nasdw_
012481.pdf [hereinafter Perino Report]. Professor Perino's report concluded that there
is little if any indication that undisclosed arbitrator conflicts represent a significant
problem in SRO-sponsored arbitrations. Nevertheless, Professor Perino recommended
minor enhancements to disclosure and other related rules to provide additional
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Supreme Court of California." 7
H. SELECTION OF AND CHALLENGE TO ARBITRATORS
Initially, the Code provided that the Director of Arbitration of the
SRO choose the panel and its chairperson, and directed that the majority
of the panel of arbitrators be public arbitrators (not be from the
securities industry), unless the public customer or "non-member"
requested otherwise." 8 In addition, the Code originally provided that
each party would have one peremptory challenge, but was later amended
to also provide for unlimited challenges for cause.'9
This method of the selection was later significantly changed by
SICA and reflected in sections 16 and 17 of the New Code, 120 which,
until recently, provided for: a hearing with a single arbitrator for claims
between $25,000 and $100,000, unless either party requests three
arbitrators; whereas, with claims over $100,000 (or where no dollar
amount is claimed or disclosed), three arbitrators will hear the case.' 2'
As of March 21, 2006, however, sections 16(a) and (b) of the SICA
Code were amended so as to presently provide that claims: (a) over
$25,000 and up to $100,000 must be heard by a single arbitrator; (b)
assurances to investors that arbitrators are in fact neutral and impartial. Professor
Perino's report made four recommendations:
(1) Amend arbitration rules to emphasize that all arbitrators' conflict
disclosures are mandatory;
(2) Re-examine the definitions of public and non-public arbitrators;
(3) Provide greater transparency with respect to challenges for cause by
including the cause standard in the rules;
(4) Sponsor independent research to evaluate fairness of SRO arbitrations.
See also TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 47, at 4.
117. See Jevne v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 111 P.3d 935, 962 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 2005); see also State Arbitration Standards Preempted by Federal Rules, Calif
High Court Holds, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 22, May 30, 2005, at 949.
118. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 497-501.
119. Id. at 500.
120. Id. See also UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, §§ 16-17.
121. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 16 (a)-(b). Furthermore, on Feb. 15, 2000,
the SEC approved NASD Rule 10336 (Single Arbitrator Pilot Program, effective May
15, 2000) which for a two year period allowed parties with claims between $50,000 and
$200,000 to voluntarily choose one arbitrator rather than a three-person panel. NASD
Dispute Resolution Launches Single Arbitrator Pilot Program, THE NEUTRAL CORNER,
July 2000, at 1.
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over $100,000 and up to $200,000 will be heard by a single arbitrator
unless either party requests three arbitrators; and (c) over $200,000 (or
where no dollar amount is claimed or disclosed) will be heard by three
arbitrators.
Moreover, instead of the SRO selecting the arbitrators, the Code
now provides that the parties may jointly select the arbitrators; otherwise
they are provided with two randomly generated lists of arbitrators -
one of public arbitrators and one of security industry arbitrators - from
the SRO's panel (list selection method).122  Under the list selection
method, if three arbitrators hear a case, a party may strike any or all of
the names from the lists without providing an explanation, and number
in order of preference the remaining names on the list, if any.123
Arbitrators are invited to serve based upon the parties' mutual
preference ranking. 1
24
In the event the forum cannot select the arbitrator from the names
not stricken, then a second list will be submitted to the parties. The
second list will contain three names for each vacancy to fill out the
panel. Each side shall be given one strike per vacancy from the second
list without providing an explanation. 25 In the event of a subsequent
vacancy, the vacancy will be filled from the parties' list of mutually
acceptable arbitrators in order of the parties' indicated preferences. 26 If
a full panel, or a vacancy thereon, cannot be appointed through this
process, additional arbitrators are appointed by the Director of
122. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 17. If one arbitrator hears the case, each
party receives only one list of public arbitrators. Id. § 17(b).
123. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 18. If one arbitrator hears a case, each party
may strike any or all of the names from the list without providing an explanation. Id. §
10(a)(1). The NASD has adopted a different version of list selection, where each party
has unlimited challenges to the original list, then the NASD appoints the remaining
needed panel members to which there are no automatic strikes, only those for cause.
See Douglas J. Schulz, The New NASD Arbitrator Selection Process, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Mar. 1999, at 2.
124. TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 4-5.
125. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 18. The NASD does not provide for a second
list, whereas the NYSE did under a pilot program; however, the NYSE has now also
eliminated this second list. See NYSE List Selection, SEC. ARB. ALERT, 2005-47, Dec.
7, 2005, at 2; see also Constantine N. Katsoris, A Life Without SICA, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, July 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Katsoris VII].
126. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 17(c)(3); TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 4-
5.
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Arbitration. 2 7 To reduce the risk that such administrative action would
result in the appointment of a replacement arbitrator who was
unacceptable to either party, SICA amended the Code to permit one
overall peremptory challenge per case to each side to such SRO
appointments. 128
1. DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BY ARBITRA TORS
Section 19 (section 11 of the Old Code) requires each arbitrator "to
disclose to the Director of Arbitration any circumstances which might
preclude such arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial
determination."'' 2 9 After McMahon, the section was expanded to parallel
Canon II of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
(Code of Ethics) by explicitly imposing a duty upon the arbitrator to
disclose any potential conflict - an ongoing duty which continues
throughout the proceeding.130  To facilitate this process, arbitrators
receive a copy of the Arbitrators' Code of Ethics when they are assigned
to a case, in order to highlight the types of disclosures required and also
receive a copy of SICA's Arbitrator's Manual, which was developed to
instruct arbitrators concerning their duties and responsibilities.' 3 '
Before McMahon, the Director had been authorized to remove an
arbitrator before the commencement of the first hearing based upon
information disclosed pursuant to the section;' after McMahon, the
Director was further empowered to effect such removal after hearings
127. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 17(d); TENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 4-5.
128. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 20.
129. SECOND REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION
TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION A-5 (Dec. 1978) (on file with author)
[hereinafter SECOND REPORT].
130. For example, the Code of Ethics requires that an arbitrator reveal any direct or
indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration, and existing or
past financial, business, professional, family, or social relationships, which are likely to
affect impartiality or that might reasonably create an appearance of bias. See Katsoris
IV, supra note 24, at 501 & n. 113.
131. Id. at 501; SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE
ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (Jan. 2001), http://www.nasd.com/ (follow "Arbitration &
Mediation" hyperlink; then follow "Resources for Arbitrators & Mediators" hyperlink;
then follow "General Information and Reference" hyperlink; then follow "Arbitrator's
Manual" hyperlink) [hereinafter ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL].
132. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 50 1; ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 131.
ROADMAP TO SECURITIES ADR
had already commenced based upon information required to be
disclosed, but not known to the parties when the arbitrator was
selected.'33 To further clarify the Director's authority to remove sitting
arbitrators, section 19(d)(1) of the Code was recently amended to
specifically provide that the Director will remove or disqualify from
appointment any arbitrator who the Director concludes intentionally has
failed to disclose material information as to his or her background,
experience, potential or existing conflicts of interest or bias. 1
34
In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission sponsored a
study by Professor Michael Perino regarding the operation of arbitrator
disclosure requirements in securities arbitration. 135 Among other things,
Professor Perino sought empirical data on the experience of investors in
securities arbitration, and determined that the most comprehensive study
of investor outcomes was the GAO's 1992 report, Securities Arbitration:
How Investors Fare, 36 which examined results in arbitration over an
eighteen-month period between 1989 and 1990. The report found "no
evidence of a systematic pro-industry bias" in arbitrations sponsored by
the NASD, NYSE, and other SROs when compared to arbitrations
conducted by the AAA. Among other things, the GAO noted, in SRO
arbitrations, panels found for investors in about 59% of arbitrations
versus 60% of AAA-sponsored arbitrations, and prevailing investors
received average awards of about 61% of the damages, as opposed to
awards averaging 57% of amounts claimed in AAA proceedings.13
7
In addition, Professor Perino in his report recommended that there
be a new independent survey on the perception of fairness of the
arbitration process. In response to that suggestion, SICA has
commissioned an independent survey on the perceptions of fairness
between SRO arbitration and litigation, and it is anticipated that this
survey will be completed sometime in the year 2006.138
133. See ELEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION (June 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter ELEVENTH REPORT].
134. See THIRTEENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION 4 (Oct. 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter THIRTEENTH REPORT].
135. See Perino Report, supra note 116.
136. Id. at 31 (citing SECURITIES ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS FARE, GAO/GGD-
92-74 (May 2002)).
137. Id.
138. See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 134, at 6.
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J COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDING
1. Pleadings
Section 7 (section 13 of the Old Code) sets out the requirements for
the commencement of an arbitration proceeding by listing the general
pleading and service requirements regarding such items as: the
Statement of Claim; Submission Agreement; Answer; Counterclaim
and/or Cross-claims; and Claims-over. 139 Moreover, in an effort to
encourage meaningful and timely pleadings, this section empowers the
arbitrators to bar evidence at a hearing: (i) where only a general denial
was pleaded; (ii) where available defenses or relevant facts were not
pleaded; 40 or, (iii) where a party fails to file a timely answer. 141
After McMahon, and largely for purposes of paring escalating costs,
SICA required the parties to serve upon each other all pleadings after the
service of the Statement of Claim. 4  The SROs, however, continue to
be responsible for serving the Statement of Claim, 43 whereas the parties
are now required to serve all other parties with the other pleadings, and
file copies thereof with the Director of Arbitration. 44 To facilitate this
new procedure, the Code specifically permits service by mail or other
means of delivery.
45
The areas of dispute are framed by the pleadings, so the pleadings
should be complete, precise and written in simple English. 46 They are
the arbitrators' first exposure to the case, so they should not ramble.
14
The Statement of Claim should be expressed in plain language and seek
139. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 502.
140. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 38, at C-5 to C-6; see also UNIF. CODE, supra note
50, § 7(b)(6)(a).
141. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 33-34; see also UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, §
7(b)(6)(b).
142. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 40, at 8-9; see also UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, §
8(d).
143. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 7(a).
144. Id. § 7(b).
145. Id. § 6.
146. See Katsoris V, supra note 92, at 311.
147. Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kupersmith, The Nuts and Bolts of Working
Within the System: A Guide to Arbitration at the New York Stock Exchange, 1061
PLI/CoRP. 93 (July - Aug. 1998).
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specific relief.148 It should be concise, yet include sufficient details to
convince the arbitrators that the various claims pleaded have substance
and the facts alleged are accurate. 149 The damages sought should be
clear and, to the extent possible, well defined. Relevant documents may
be attached to the Statement of Claim to assist the arbitrators in
understanding the claims.150
The Answer should be just that, an answer - not simply a vague or
general denial. 51 It should contain all available defenses. 52 The answer
is the respondent's opportunity to refute the claimant's allegations.1 53 It
should tell the respondent's version, supplying pertinent information that
the claimant neglected to provide. 154  Just as with the Statement of
Claim, relevant documents may also be attached to the Answer if they
will assist the arbitrators in understanding the respondent's side of the
story. 
55
2. Joinder and Consolidation / Multiple Parties
Where multiple claimants have similar issues involving the same
respondent or respondents, section 8 of the Code permits joinder and
consolidation, the propriety of which is initially ruled upon by the
Director of Arbitration. 5 6 Upon the request of a party, the Director's
decision is subject to review by the arbitrators who make all final
decisions regarding joining and consolidating multiple parties and
claims. 1
57
3. Acknowledgement of Pleadings by Arbitrators
Section 25 of the Code requires that the arbitrators acknowledge
148. See Katsoris V, supra note 92, at 311.
149. Id.
150. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 7. Documents that are irrelevant to the
proceedings, however, should not be attached to the pleadings, and can often prove
counterproductive. See Katsoris V, supra note 92, at 311.
151. See Katsoris V, supra note 92, at 311.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 8.
157. Id. §§ 8(c)-(d).
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that they have read the pleadings filed by the parties. 5
4. Amendment to Pleadings
The Old Code initially provided that amended pleadings would not
be permitted after receipt of a responsive pleading without the consent
of the arbitrators. 5 9 This was subsequently changed by now permitting
amending pleadings after receipt of a responsive pleading, but before the
appointment of the arbitration panel. 160 Moreover, after McMahon, the
Code was further amended; and section 13 of the New Code now
imposes upon the party making the changes the obligation to serve the
new or different pleadings, whereas initially that burden fell upon the
Director of Arbitration.161
K. REPRESENTATION BYAN ATTORNEY
Originally, the Code (section 15 of the Old Code) simply provided
that all parties have the right to representation by counsel. 162  This
permitted parties to be assisted in their presentation at the hearing by
anyone they chose, even if that person was not an attorney (usually a
relative or accountant). In 1991, however, SICA began to receive
complaints that many claimants were being represented in SRO
arbitrations not by their friends, accountants, business associates, or
relatives, but by professional groups who were not attorneys (Non-
Attorney Representatives, or NARs). 163
For a variety of reasons, SICA first viewed this as a subject which
would best be handled at the state level, because attorneys general and
bar associations have the principal responsibility for dealing with
questions relating to business practices and the standards and
qualifications to practice law, and would thus be better suited to handle
158. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 25(c).
159. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 129.
160. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 13.
161. Id.; see also supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
162. SECOND REPORT, supra note 129, at A-8.
163. Constantine N. Katsoris, Foreword to Report of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration on Representation of Parties in Arbitration by Non-
Attorneys, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 505 (1995) [hereinafter NARs Report]; SICA
Report on Non-Attorney Representations, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1995, at 1.
See also Regulating Nonlawyers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 103.
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this multifaceted problem at the local level.1 64  But the complaints
persisted, and since they raised questions as to whether customers were
being adequately represented in SRO arbitrations, SICA felt obligated to
address this sensitive and thorny issue.
1 65
1. NARs Report
Because of the enormous stakes and widely divergent opinions on
this issue of representation, SICA decided, for the first time in its
history, to solicit public comment (as the SEC and other regulatory
agencies do prior to adopting a rule) in order to elicit the views of the
public and affected parties.166 Accordingly, SICA held two special
meetings at opposite ends of the country, at which numerous individuals
and organizations appeared, including organizations of Non-Attorney
Representatives. 167 SICA listened, and, in 1995, issued a report on Non-
Attorney Representation in Arbitration ("NARs Report"). 68 The NARs
Report concluded that certain activities of Non-Attorney Representatives
("NARs") constituted the practice of law and might even constitute the
unauthorized practice of law. SICA also determined that some NARs'
claims regarding successful recoveries were inaccurate and
misleading, 69 and, as such, raised questions under various state and
federal advertising statutes or other consumer regulations.'7"
Accordingly, SICA sent the NARs Report to bar associations and to
164. NARs Report, supra note 163.
165. Id.
166. Id. An interesting development occurred in a California case, where a NAR
consented to a permanent injunction barring the NAR from future arbitration
proceedings against the brokerage firm and its employees. See Sutro & Co. v. Richard
L. Sacks, No. 965943 (Sup. Ct. of Cal. San Francisco Co., Nov. 17, 1995).
167. See NARs Report, supra note 163, at 506; see also SAC Report on Non-
Attorney Representation, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1994, at 3-6.
168. See NARs Report, supra note 163, at 506.
169. See id. at 524; see also S. Estreicher and S. Bennett, Is Arbitration the
Unauthorized Practice of Law?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 2005, at 3.
170. See NARs Report, supra note 163; see also Michael Scionolfi, Imperfect
Advocate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at Al ("It's a seductive pitch to injured investors
who distrust lawyers: A firm led by former brokers - not lawyers - will represent you
in your brokerage disputes, pledging low fees and high returns .... But a group of IAS
clients and former employees complain that the.., investment recovery firm has
instead found a variety of ways to take them to the cleaners.").
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attorney licensing bodies, as well as to the attorneys general and state
regulatory officials with jurisdiction over advertising in each of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and the Federal Trade
Commission.
Subsequent to the issuance of the NARs Report, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that compensated non-lawyer representation in
securities arbitration constituted the unauthorized practice of law and
enjoined non-lawyers from representing investors in securities
arbitration proceedings for compensation. 7' Moreover, in California,
the Supreme Court held a law firm that was not licensed to practice in
California could not recover fees under a fee agreement for work done
within California for a California client involving California law, and, to
the extent it practiced law in California, was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.12  The Court further noted that such
prohibitions extended to arbitration. 173  Such restrictions on
representation by out-of-state attorneys in SRO securities arbitration,
however, further exacerbate the difficulty that investors with small
claims experience in obtaining counsel. For some investors, it places
them in the unenviable position of having to choose between abandoning
their claim or representing themselves on a pro se basis.1
74
171. The Florida Bar re: Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Representation in
Securities Arbitration, 696 So.2d 1178 (Fla. July 3, 1997). Indeed, the Florida Bar
Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law mulled prohibiting out-of-state
lawyers from being the sole representative of a party in NASD cases. See Florida Bar's
UPL Committee Focuses on Out-of-State Attorney's Role in Securities Arbitration, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, May 1999, at 9. See also Out-of-State Attorneys, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Mar. 1999, at 14. See also Florida Court and Bar Continue to Debate
Rules of Arbitration Practice, 16 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 6, at 171 (June
2005).
172. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
4th 119 (Cal. 1998); see Licensing Attorneys for Arbitration Practices, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1998, at 16; see also California Birbrower Bill Signed into Law;
Anti-Arbitration Bill Vetoed, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1998, at 9. The Birbrower
bill provided a procedure for non-resident attorneys who are not licensed to practice in
California to appear in California arbitration proceedings. Id.
173. See Birbrower, 17 Cal. 4th 119; see Licensing Attorneys for Arbitration
Practices, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1998, at 16; see also California Birbrower
Bill Signed into Law; Anti-Arbitration Bill Vetoed, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct.
1998, at 9.
174. Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration: A Clinical Experiment, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 193, 194 (1998) [hereinafter Katsoris VIII].
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Finally, in recognition of the fact that SRO securities arbitration
claims procedures are basically identical throughout the United States,
SICA recently amended section 4(b) of the Code to emphasize that,
subject to local law, all parties can be represented in an arbitration
proceeding in a United States hearing location by an attorney admitted
to practice in any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or
possession of the United States or foreign country.'75 Furthermore,
regarding representation by non-attorneys, SICA added section 4(d) of
the Code to further provide that, subject to local law, parties may be
assisted by a person who is not an attorney (such as a business associate,
friend, or relative), if that person is not receiving compensation for
services rendered in representing the party. 76 Moreover, in the absence
of a court order, the arbitration proceedings shall not be stayed or
otherwise delayed pending resolution of such issues. 1
77
2. Clinical Representation
In a separate but related development, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt,
in an attempt to help small investors, suggested that clinical programs
could be developed at local law schools to render assistance by
providing representation to investors with small claims. 178  In a
cooperative effort, the SEC met with representatives of SICA, several
law schools in New York City, and the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York ("Bar Association").17 9 As a result, it was agreed that
the Bar Association would screen potential cases and either refer the
aggrieved investor to an attorney or, if counsel could not be obtained, to
a participating law school clinic. 8 ° Although about twelve such clinics
175. THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 134, at 4.
176. See id. See also supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
177. See UMIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 4(c).
178. See Katsoris VIII, supra note 174, at 202. See also Diana B. Henriques, Aidfor
the Little Guy in Securities Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, § 3, at 8.
179. See Katsoris VIII, supra note 174, at 202.
180. Id. See also Victoria Rivkin, Help For Small Investors; Clinics Provide
Guidance on Arbitration Claims, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 5; see also Katsoris VIII,
supra note 174, at 202; Fordham Law Students Win Punitives for Investors, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, June 2003, at 12 ("[O]nce a case is accepted, the full panoply of ADR
procedures should be available, as with private representation .... [I]f mediation is
practical, it should also be available to the clinic. Similarly, if an award has to be
confirmed or vacated, the clinic should be able to do so."); Leonard Post, Help for
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have been established, unfortunately most are located in the Northeast,
still leaving an unmet need in many parts of the country; and, to this end,
SICA is encouraging the establishment of additional clinics in order to
achieve broader geographical coverage."'
L. DESIGNATION OF TIME AND PLA CE OF HEARING
The Code initially provided that "[u]nless the law directs
otherwise," the Director of Arbitration determines the time and place for
the initial hearing upon notice of at least eight (presently fifteen)
business days; 8 2 and, thereafter, the arbitrators would determine the
time and place of subsequent hearings.1
83
Subsequent to McMahon, SICA eliminated the reference "[u]nless
the law directs otherwise" so as to nullify location of hearing provisions
incorporated into brokerage contracts. Thus, section 10 of the Code now
prevents a member firm from unfairly controlling the selection of a
hearing location and thereby causing the customer to bear unreasonable
expense to pursue a claim.
M PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES/INFORMATION GATHERING
Section 23 of the present Code incorporates the subject matter
originally found in the Old Code [sections 20 (Subpoena Process) and
'churned and burned': Small Investors Seek Out Law School Securities-Arbitration
Clinics, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A6 ("The SEC, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and local bar
associations refer prospective clients to the clinics. Besides having a compelling case,
clients must also qualify under a school's financial criteria.").
181. See Law School Clinics Meet at Fordham, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr.
2005, at 14. Indeed, at a day-long roundtable attended by directors of clinics at ten law
schools, attendees voted to form an informal association, tentatively called National
Association of Securities Arbitration and Mediation Clinics (NASAMC). Id. at 15. See
also THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 134, at 6. Indeed, on February 24, 2006, the
Third Annual Roundtable of Clinics was held at Fordham Law School, which was
attended by representatives of the SEC, N.Y. State Attorney General, NASD, NYSE,
the author, and the following law schools: Albany; Brooklyn; Buffalo; Cardozo;
Duquesne; Fordham; Hofstra; New York; Northwestern; St. Johns; and Syracuse. See
Securities Arbitration Clinic Roundtable, SEC. ARB. ALERT, Mar. 9, 2006, at 1.
182. SECOND REPORT, supra note 129, at A-8.
183. Id.
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21 (Power to Direct Appearances) of the Old Code] 8.1 4 Originally, the
Old Code simply provided that the parties were expected to voluntarily
exchange documents as would "serve to expedite the arbitration"
without establishing any mechanism to ensure cooperation in production
of documents and information.'85 Accordingly, some parties did not
produce documents until the day of the hearing. Such practice was
patently unfair and often resulted in trial by ambush.'86
1. Discovery Orders and Compliance
Admittedly, arbitrators always had the inherent authority to resolve
discovery disputes in advance of the hearing. 117 Indeed, even before
McMahon, some SROs forwarded discovery disputes to arbitrators prior
to hearings on the merits, giving the panel the authority to resolve
discovery issues in advance of the first hearing. 8 8 On the other hand,
some arbitrators, particularly those who were not attorneys, were
reluctant to exercise such powers without specific authorization in the
Uniform Code. 8 9
After McMahon, SICA decided to codify the informal practice of
some SROs to get the arbitrators involved in discovery disputes before
the first hearing.' 90  Accordingly, SICA added specific provisions
relating to pre-hearing conferences and procedures for pre-hearing
document and information production. 19'
Under the present Code, a request for documents or information
may be served, 192 and if a party objects or fails to honor a request, a pre-
hearing conference may be requested to resolve the impasse. 93 In order
to eliminate protracted and unnecessary bickering over the production of
documents considered customary and ordinary, it was suggested that
basic lists be created of documents that must be automatically
184. See ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 133, at 41.
185. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 511 (quoting FIFTH REPORT)..
186. Id. at 512.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 23.
193. Id.
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produced. 194
2. Witness Lists
Section 23 of the Code further authorizes a sole arbitrator to act on
behalf of the entire panel to set deadlines for compliance with discovery
orders.' 95 In addition, section 24 provides that the parties are required to
exchange the names and business affiliations of witnesses and the
documents they intend to use in their direct case at least 20 days before
the first scheduled hearing date.' 96
3. Subpoenas
The Code always provided that all parties to a dispute are to receive
copies of any subpoenas issued.197 Unfortunately, such notice was not
always timely; therefore, section 23 was amended to provide that service
of a copy of such request or subpoena be made in a manner that is
reasonably expected to be delivered to all parties on the same day. 198
This requirement was an attempt to promptly notify, and thus permit the
opposing party a reasonable opportunity to seek to quash third party
subpoenas indiscriminately or improperly issued before the materials are
turned over by the recipient of such subpoenas.
194. See Symposium, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in
The Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1495, 1551-61 (1995) [hereinafter NYSE
Symposium]; Securities Arbitration Reform: Report Of The Arbitration Policy Task
Force To The Board Of Governors National Association Of Securities Dealers, Inc., at
82 (Jan. 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ruder Report]; NASD Files Discovery
Guide Proposal for Use in NASD Arbitrations, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 1999, at
8; ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 12-3. In October 1999, the NASD made
available a Discovery Guide for use in customer cases, which includes Document
Production Lists which provide guidance to parties on which documents they should
presumptively exchange without arbitrator or staff intervention, and guidance to
arbitrators in determining which documents parties should produce in customer
arbitrations. Id.
195. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 512; see also UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, §
23(b).
196. See UNMF. CODE, supra note 50, § 24(a). Moreover, such lists must also be
served on the Director of Arbitration. Id. § 24(c).
197. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 23(c).
198. Id. § 23(c)(1). See also Seth E. Lipner, Phony As A $3 Bill: Attorney-Issued
Discovery Subpoenas in Arbitration, 10 PIABA BAR J. No. 2 (Summer 2003), at 2.
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In addition, in order to prevent premature compliance by non-
parties to third party subpoenas (before the non-serving party has an
opportunity to object), the Uniform Code was recently further amended
to require ten days prior notice before the issuance of such subpoenas in
order to afford the objecting party an opportunity to seek to limit or
quash it.' 99
4. Depositions
Although the Code omits any reference to pre-hearing depositions,
the circumstances under which such depositions are usually ordered by
the arbitrators are discussed in SICA's Arbitrator's Manual. °° Mindful
of the excessive use of depositions in court litigation, and the resultant
increase in cost and delay, depositions are more sparingly used in SRO
arbitrations. Indeed, it is suggested that depositions should normally be
"limited to preserving the testimony of ill or dying witnesses, or persons
who are unable to travel long distances for a hearing and cannot
otherwise be required to attend the hearing, as well as to expedite large
or complex cases."' ' In any event, parties can agree to depose a witness
without asking the permission of the arbitrators.20 2
5. Resolution Format
On the whole, the expanded pre-hearing procedures of the Uniform
Code enhance the arbitration process. Admittedly, the new procedures
may initially involve some additional expense and delay, but this is more
than counter-balanced by the equitable consideration of preventing
undue surprise and possible prejudice to either party once the hearings
on the merits begin. In fact, the resolution of such disputes before the
first hearing ultimately saves time and expense, and sets the tone for
more orderly hearings.
In practice, some of the pre-hearing proceedings are conducted by
telephone conference calls. Although such conference calls may be less
199. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 23(c)(2)-(4). The Uniform Code of
Arbitration provides that arbitrators shall have the power to quash or limit the scope of
any subpoenas. Id. § 23(c)(6).
200. ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 9.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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expensive and more convenient, they are not always the most effective
method, particularly in a large or complex case involving several parties.
In that case, it is often more productive if the arbitrator overseeing the
discovery process orders a formal face-to-face hearing. Section 23 also
permits a sole arbitrator (selected for these pre-hearing proceedings) to
refer any issue to the full panel, and, in the appropriate case, the sole
arbitrator should not hesitate to do so, for many of the same issues may
again resurface, to be ruled upon by the entire panel during the
hearings.20 3
The best hope for preventing these procedures from dragging out
and increasing the cost of the proceedings (as often happens in court
litigation) is to have experienced and knowledgeable arbitrators who do
not let matters get out of hand. Indeed, in appropriate cases, sanctions
should be considered. 0 4
N. EXPEDITED PROCEDURES / ELDERLY OR SERIOUSLY ILL
The Uniform Code has attempted to balance the competing goals of
speed, fairness and economy, with the need for preserving procedural
due process. Where one of the parties is elderly or seriously ill,
however, special consideration must be given to accommodate their
needs. Although arbitrators have generally been sensitive to expediting
matters involving the elderly or seriously ill, it has been suggested that
some form of formal recognition of such policy be established.
Accordingly, SICA is presently studying how to improve the arbitration
process "for disputes involving elderly or seriously ill parties, while
maintaining procedural balance and fairness for all involved parties. 20 5
203. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 23(b).
204. See Emily Thornton, The Brokers Strike Back, Bus. WK., Aug. 16, 2004, at 70.
"Since January, arbitration panels have fined six investors for abusing rules requiring
them to hand over documents without delay. In the same period, they have cited 16
firms for the same reason." Id. In addition, "on July 19, Merrill was one of three firms,
with Morgan Stanley and Citigroup, each fined $250,000 by the NASD for failing to
produce documents in a total of 20 cases." Id.
205. NASD Expedites Elder Cases, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, July 2004, at 7; see
also THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 134, at 3-4.
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0. HEARINGS
1. Attendance at Hearings
Section 25 of the Uniform Code simply provides that except for
parties and their attorneys, the arbitrators decide the attendance or
presence of other persons at the hearings. In addition, the Code provides
that a hearing be held and an award rendered despite the fact that a party
fails to appear at a hearing, after due notice was given.2 °6
Greater guidance, however, is provided in the Arbitrator's Manual,
which presently provides that a corporate party may designate a
representative as it may choose, whether or not that representative is
going to be a fact witness. In addition, absent persuasive reasons to the
contrary, there is a presumption that expert witnesses, as opposed to fact
witnesses, should be permitted to attend the entire proceedings. The
Manual further provides
that absent persuasive reasons to the contrary, and subject to the
ultimate authority of the arbitrators, the investor party should be
permitted to designate one individual to attend the hearing, as there
are many instances where an investor wishes to have a spouse, son or
daughter, accountant or other fact witness attend to provide added
support and valuable assistance to the investor party.
2 0
Indeed, such presence can provide invaluable assistance to the
investor party when hearing the testimony of fact witnesses; but these
designations should be made before the hearings start.
It has also been suggested on occasion that, in the interest of
transparency, SRO arbitrations be open to the press and the public at
large. Whatever benefits such access would bring, it is respectfully
suggested that, on balance, it would be counterproductive. SROs would
be hard pressed to provide the additional space (at their numerous
hearing sites scattered throughout the country) that would be required by
such expanded attendance, as well as posing additional security
concerns. Moreover, the presence of the press or public would
206. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 25; see also Constantine N. Katsoris, 'I
Won't Sit Without a Record", SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1990, at 1 [hereinafter
Katsoris IX].
207. See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 134, at 5.
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encourage many parties and their representatives to posture instead of
trying their case, turning many arbitrations into theater instead of a
search for the truth - particularly if inexperienced arbitrators are
involved. In addition, sensitive issues of confidentiality or privilege of
either party could be compromised. Accordingly, such efforts have not
to date gained traction.
2. Record of Proceedings
Initially, there was no requirement that a record of arbitration
proceedings be kept,20 8 but, after McMahon, the Code was amended and
presently requires that a verbatim record of all proceedings be kept
either by stenographic reporter or tape recording. 209 This flexibility as to
the method of recording takes into account the significant cost
differential between a stenographic record and a tape recording.
Nevertheless, in a multi-sessioned proceeding spanning over a long
period of time, a stenographic record is preferable, because it more
easily enables the arbitrators to refresh their recollection of past
testimony.210
3. Oaths of Arbitrators and Witnesses
The Code provides that the oath or affirmation shall be
administered to the arbitrators before the first session and that all
testimony shall be under oath or affirmation.21'
4. Adjournments
Initially, the Code merely authorized arbitrators to grant
adjournments; however, as time went on, the issue of adjournments
became a chronic problem. A horseback survey at several of the SROs
revealed that many of the cases had their first hearing date postponed
208. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 514.
209. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 25(d). At the NYSE the proceedings are
recorded by stenographic reporter, whereas tape recording is routinely used at the
NASD.
210. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 514.
211. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 21 (a). See also Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at
515.
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after the panel had already been appointed.1 2 Indeed, even this first
adjourned date was often subsequently adjourned one or more additional
times before the first actual hearing was held.
Even though all the parties may have stipulated to such
adjournments, they nonetheless impact upon the arbitration process.
Repeated adjournments often result in having to replace arbitrators (who
have already cleared the selection process) 2 3 because of their
unavailability on the new adjourned date or dates. This causes further
delay because the SRO staff must then seek a replacement arbitrator or
arbitrators who also have to clear the challenge and conflict hurdles de
novo. Moreover, such repeated adjournments discourage many
excellent and qualified arbitrators from serving, either because it results
in their replacement after having already qualified, or because of the
inconvenience of having to block out dates only to have them
subsequently cancelled through adjournments.
These seemingly harmless adjournments undercut the two
advantages of arbitration - speed and economy. The more
adjournments granted, the longer resolution is delayed, and the more
expensive it becomes for the parties, as well as to the forum hosting the
arbitration.
Before McMahon, SICA addressed this problem by amending the
Code to provide that if a party requested an adjournment (after the
arbitrators had already been appointed) and the adjournment was
granted, that party had to pay a fee equal to the initial deposit of costs,
but not to exceed $100.214 As time went on, it became evident that this
penalty was not a sufficient deterrent. Accordingly, after McMahon,
SICA not only increased the adjournment fees, but also made them
mandatory at the time of the request, unless waived by the Director of
Arbitration.215
212. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 509.
213. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
214. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 510.
215. Id. The first request requires a deposit of a fee equal to the initial hearing
session deposit, and the second request a fee equal to double that amount (but not to
exceed $1,000.00). See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 10(c)(2). In any event, the
arbitrators may also direct the refund of a postponement fee if a postponement is
granted. Id. Moreover, if a third request is made that is consented to by all the parties,
the arbitrators could dismiss the arbitration, subject to the claimant's refiling their claim
as a new arbitration. Id. §10(c)(3).
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5. Evidence
Section 21 of the Code provides that arbitrators determine the
materiality and admissibility of evidence. As a result, arbitrators are not
necessarily bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence or state evidentiary
rules. 2" Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that although the
grounds for vacating an arbitration award are limited under the Federal
Arbitration Act, one such ground is that the arbitrators unreasonably
refused to hear relevant or material evidence. 1 7 Accordingly, although
arbitrators may not be bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, most
arbitrators adhere to some reasonable semblance thereof, often leaning
in favor of inclusion rather than exclusion.
6. Reopening of Hearings
Section 26 of the Code authorizes the arbitrators, where permitted
by law, to reopen the hearings on their own motion, or in the discretion
of the arbitrators (upon application of a party), at any time before the
award is rendered.2t 8 Although the Code is silent on the grounds for
such re-opening, they should include such circumstances as perjured or
coerced testimony.21 9
7. Confidentiality
The Code does not directly address the issue of the confidentiality
of arbitration proceedings, and, until recently, the Arbitrator's Manual
simply provided that arbitrators "must consider all aspects of an
arbitration to be confidential" and that "[r]ecords of the arbitration
hearing should not be provided by the arbitrators to non-parties. '20 The
aforementioned language was intended to encourage arbitrators to
respect the privacy of the parties before whom they serve, being careful
not to casually divulge information obtained during the course of the
proceeding. Unfortunately, some arbitrators misinterpreted these
216. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 514.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 515.
219. Id. at 515-16.
220. ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 23. For a reproduction of the
ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, see ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 133, at 67.
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instructions and routinely ordered that all matters pertaining to the
dispute be held confidential by everyone involved - including the
parties.
2 2 1
To clarify this issue, SICA recently amended its Manual by
modifying these instructions by adding thereto:
Nothing in this provision should be interpreted as either imposing a
blanket of confidentiality on the parties to the arbitration or
preventing the arbitrators from entering a confidentiality order as to
certain documents and information exchanged between the parties in
the course of the arbitration and in accordance with the provisions
set forth in the 'Pre-hearing Conference' section of this manual.
222
Moreover, the Pre-hearing Conference section of the Manual was
also concurrently amended by the insertion of the following language:
Ideally, the parties will agree on the form and content of any
confidentiality order. In some instances, however, the parties will
not agree what is or is not confidential. When deliberating contested
requests for confidentiality orders, the arbitrator(s) should bear in
mind that the party asserting/requesting confidentiality has the
burden of establishing that the documents or information in question
are entitled to confidential treatment. Arbitrators should not
automatically designate all discovery as confidential. When the
party requesting confidentiality has met the burden of establishing
the need for confidentiality of certain documents or information, the
arbitrator(s) should strive to accomplish the confidentiality sought in
the least restrictive manner possible.
223
P. RULINGS OF ARBITRATORS AND A WARDS
1. Interpretation of Code and Enforcement ofArbitrators' Rulings
The Code always provided that arbitrators have the final authority
221. See Neutral Roster Subcomm. of the Nat'l Arbitration & Mediation Comm.
(NAMC), Arbitrators and Orders of Confidentiality, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Apr. 2004,
at 1.
222. See ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 131, at 23 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 9.
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to interpret the provisions of the Code.2 24 After McMahon, however, the
Code was amended to specifically empower the arbitrators to take
appropriate action to obtain compliance with their rulings including, but
not limited to, imposing sanctions.225
2. Determinations of Arbitrators
The Code provides that the rulings and determinations of the panel
shall be made by a majority of the arbitrators.226
3. Awards
Section 27 basically provides that: (i) all awards must be in writing
and signed by a majority of the arbitrators;227 (ii) all awards are deemed
final and not subject to review or appeal, except as provided by law;2 28
(iii) arbitrators should endeavor to render the award within thirty
business days from the date the record was closed;229 and (iv) prescribes
the manner in which the Director of Arbitration is to serve the award on
the parties.230 The section also requires that the award be made publicly
available and include summary data, such as: the names of the parties
and their counsel, if any; the names of the arbitrators; a description of
the issues in controversy; and the amounts claimed and awarded.23 ' This
data is available to the public by various vendors, and in accordance
with the policies of the sponsoring SRO.232 While arbitration is not a
system of precedents, the significance of publishing these awards is
most important in maintaining the investing public's confidence in the
224. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 514. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 2 1(c).
225. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 22; Tom Wynn, Handling Key Procedural
Issues, The Chairperson s Role, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Aug. 1996, at 3. See also
supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
226. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 21.
227. Id. § 27(b).
228. Id. § 27(c).
229. Id. § 27(e).
230. Id. § 27(d).
231. Id. § 27(f).
232. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 516; see also SAC's Award Report, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1989; Award Reporter, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct.
1989, at 1-7. Indeed, some awards are often analyzed and commented upon. Id. at 8-
10; see also NYSE Awards on WebSite, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Mar. 1999, at 14.
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SRO process.233
The section, however, does not go so far as to require the arbitrators
to issue written opinions - although they are free to do so. 234 At first
blush, this may appear to be a weakness or deficiency in the Code and of
SRO arbitration. The basic argument in favor of written opinions is that
they give insight to the parties as to the rationale for the award,235 and
help the parties in formulating opinions about arbitrators with a view
towards exercising their preferences or challenges in the future.236
Interestingly, a Federal Appellate Court - in overturning an arbitration
award on the theory of manifest disregard of the facts by the arbitration
panel - noted the absence of a written opinion to explain the
arbitrators' ruling.237 Although this court did not recommend written
opinions in all cases, it did suggest one would be advisable if there was a
probability of a reviewing court finding manifest disregard.238
On the other hand, requiring written opinions would certainly delay
the rendering of awards, as they often are arrived at on the basis of
consensus. 239 For example, assume three arbitrators (A, B and C): (i)
initially separately estimate damages of $10,000, $20,000 and $30,000,
respectively; (ii) ultimately agree on a consensus $20,000 award; and
(iii) when they write the opinion, arbitrator A bases the award on
unsuitability, arbitrator B on churning, and arbitrator C on unauthorized
trading. Can arbitrators A, B and C realistically issue a reasoned award
for $20,000, even though they totally disagree on the reasons?
Moreover, would they?
240Nor would opinions necessarily enhance the cause of fairness.
Indeed, requiring such opinions might realistically result in fewer
233. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 516.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
237. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1034 (1999). But see Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004)
(rejecting reversal of an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the facts); see also
Mark Hamblitt, Only 'Manifest Disregard of Law' Can Upset Arbitration Award, Panel
Says, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 2004, at 1.
238. See Halligan, 148 F.3d 197; see also Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., Assessing Halligan
Manifest Disregard of the Facts, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 1999, at 6.
239. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 516.
240. Id. at 517.
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awards in favor of claimants based upon general equity grounds,24' and
would put additional pressure on already strained SRO staffs, while
drafts of written opinions are circulated and re-circulated among the
various arbitrators for corrections, redrafts, and finalization.242
It is more likely that instead of being a window into the rationale of
arbitrators, a written opinion will be used as a platform and blueprint for
many more appeals, because it identifies or magnifies targets,
meaningful or otherwise, for the losing party to attack.243 Such appeals
are both costly and time consuming and ultimately result in undue delay
in the payment of any award.2 4
One area, however, where a written opinion may be advisable is in
the case of punitive damages, because of its unusual nature.245 In this
regard, it would appear that specific findings explaining the basis of the
award of punitive damages are desirable, so that the offending party and
an appellate court can better understand the rationale behind the unusual
punishment being meted out.
246
The NASD has recently proposed a rule requiring arbitrators to give
a written decision/award if requested by the claimant. Although such a
requirement seems laudatory, it has hardly met with unanimous
support.
247
241. Id.
242. Id. It must also be kept in mind that not all arbitrators share a common
background, i.e., some may be lawyers, accountants, brokers, bankers, business
executives, etc.
243. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 517.
244. Id. See also Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review ofArbitration Awards: Manifest
Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471 (1998).
245. See Katsoris X, supra note 49, at 346.
246. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 518. See also Constantine N. Katsoris, Post-
Sawtelle Tremors: Arbitration Faces New Questions about Sustainability of Punitive
Awards, 22 ALTERNATIVES 4, May 2004, at 61 [hereinafter Katsoris XI]. "When panels
issue punitive awards the panel members should explain not only their reasons for the
punishment, but also give some justification and blueprint as to their computation to
defuse an appellate court's concern as to guidelines." Id. at 76. See also Sawtelle
Award Vacated - Again!, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Nov. 2005, at 11.
247. Reflecting the wide divergence of opinion regarding awards, see Aegis J.
Frumento, Can 't Get No Satisfaction! How Explained Decisions Will Undermine the
Arbitration Process, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 2005, at 1; H. Thomas Fehn,
Arbitration Awards... Where the Sun Don't Shine, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb.
2005, at 1; Constantine N. Katsoris, Beware of What You Ask For: You Might Just Get
It, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Katsoris XII]; Jake
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4. Payment ofAwards
Undue delay in the payment of an award is particularly injurious to
the small investor, who may have an immediate need for money. SICA
was concerned that some brokers unduly delayed payment of awards
issued against them. Accordingly, after McMahon, the Code was
amended to require that all monetary awards be paid within thirty (30)
days of receipt (unless a motion to vacate has been filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction), and shall bear interest from the date of the
award.2 48 This payment requirement is a distinct advantage over court-
litigated awards and those issued at non-SRO forums, which lack
disciplinary authority over the broker/dealer. Nevertheless, non-
payment or partial payment of awards has remained somewhat of a
problem, principally because of defunct broker-dealers.
2 49
5. Scope of Award
In 1992, SICA sought to clarify the extent of arbitrators' authority
by providing that "arbitrator(s) may grant any remedy or relief that the
arbitrator(s) deem just and equitable and that would have been
available in a court with jurisdiction over the matter."250 Despite this
clear mandate, several years later the Ruder Report2 ' recommended the
Zamansky, A 'Reasoned' Arbitration Decision? Be Careful What You Ask For, WALL
ST. LAW., Feb. 2005, at 1. See also Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too Much From
NASD Arbitrators, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2004, at 1.
248. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 27(h). At one point, SICA also considered
the inclusion of a bond or escrow requirement in the Uniform Code to insure such
prompt payment, but abandoned the idea because it seemed unduly burdensome. Id.
See also Non-Payment ofAwards, SEC. ARB. ALERT, Aug. 25, 2004, at 24.
249. See UNF. CODE, supra note 50, § 27(h). At one point, SICA also considered
the inclusion of a bond or escrow requirement in the Uniform Code to insure such
prompt payment, but abandoned the idea because it seemed unduly burdensome. Id.
See also Non-Payment of Awards, SEC. ARB. ALERT, Aug. 25, 2004, at 24; GAO 2000
Securities Arbitration Review, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 2000, at 1. There have
been particular difficulties with NASD awards, and in an attempt to alleviate the
problem NASD Notice 00-55 was sent to its members outlining procedures aimed at
monitoring the collection of such awards. Id. See also NASDR to require Certification
of Compliance with Arbitration Awards, 32 BNA FED. NEWS 35, at 1192.
250. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 27(a) (emphasis added).
251. In the fall of 1994, the NASD announced the formation of an Arbitration Task
Force ("Ruder Committee" or "Task Force") to explore and propose broad reforms to
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imposition of an inflexible cap on punitive damages of two times
compensatory damages, or $750,000, whichever is less (rigid cap
rule). 2  In spite of significant opposition, the NASD submitted the rigid
cap rule in a 19(b) filing with the SEC.2 3 By way of comparison, no
other SRO, nor the AAA, sought a similar cap on punitive damages. 4
From the investor's point of view, a rigid ceiling of $750,000 is
totally inadequate in situations involving large compensatory awards.
Curiously, the Ruder Task Force sought to justify its two tiered cap,
whichever is lower, saying that it "will protect broker-dealers from
'runaway' awards that have no relationship to compensatory
damages. '255 Yet, the Task Force failed to apply this same standard to
its own proposed remedy. For example, what relationship does a
$750,000 punitive damages award have to a $20 million compensatory
award?
The conventional wisdom underlying the broad embracement of
arbitration by the Supreme Court in McMahon was an investor's ability
to obtain in arbitration whatever relief was available in court.25 6 Not
only does the Ruder Report's rigid cap rule violate that mandate,257 but
the arbitration process, including the contentious issue of punitive damages. In early
1996, The Ruder Committee issued its report which was over 150 pages in length and
contained scores of recommendations, most of them quite constructive. See
Constantine N. Katsoris, Ruder Report Is a Delicate Compromise, 14 ALTERNATIVES 29
(Mar. 1996) [hereinafter Katsoris XIII]; see also supra note 194.
252. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Betrayal of McMahon, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
221, 225 (1997) [hereinafter Katsoris XIV]. See also Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive
Damages In Securities Arbitration: The Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 573 (1991) [hereinafter Katsoris XV].
253. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of
Arbitration, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1997). But see David S. Ruder, Securities Arbitration
in the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive Damages, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 69 (1997);
Richard E. Speidel, Punitive Damages and the Public Interest Model of Securities
Arbitration: A Response to Professor Stipanowich, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 99 (1997).
254. Katsoris XIV, supra note 252, at 225.
255. Ruder Report, supra note 194, at 43.
256. Katsoris XIV, supra note 252, at 229.
257. Leslie Eaton, Investing It; Arbitration Rules Would Give Some, Take Some,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, § 3, at 3 ("The new rules are 'supposed to make sure
investors can get in arbitration what they can get in court."') (quoting Linda Fienberg);
see also NYSE Symposium, supra note 194, at 1495. "Limitations on what arbitrators
can do that are not parallel to what judges can do would be hostile to arbitration as a full
alternative dispute resolution system." Id. at 1532 (statement of Catherine McGuire,
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more importantly, by using the SRO rules as the vehicle for its
enforcement, it undermines the public's confidence of the fairness of
SRO arbitration by rekindling the perception that the SRO process was
stacked against the public investor.258 More than two years after the
NASD's filing of the rigid cap rule (with no SEC approval),259 the
NASD (in the spring of 1999) issued a new 19(b) filing (permissive cap
rule).260 Although the permissive cap rule did not directly impose a rigid
cap, it nevertheless permitted NASD members to insert into agreements
Esq., Chief Counsel, Market Regulation of the SEC). In addition, "[the FAA] prohibits
enforcement of a contractual provision that limits remedies available to customers if the
remedies are available in court." Id. at 1584. "The way arbitration was sold to both the
Supreme Court and the SEC was that essentially you have the same rights in arbitration
as you would have in court." Id. at 1523 (statement of Boyd Page, Esq., Ruder
Committee member); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-26805, 43 SEC Docket
1417, 1427 (1989). "Agreements cannot be used to curtail any rights that a party may
otherwise have in a judicial forum." If punitive damages, or attorneys' fees would be
available under applicable law, then the agreement cannot limit parties' rights to request
them, nor arbitrators' rights to award them. Id.
258. See Shearson American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 261 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("As even the most ardent supporter of arbitration would
recognize, the arbitral process at best places the investor on an equal footing with the
securities-industry personnel against whom the claims are brought."). Furthermore,
there remains the danger that, at worst, compelling an investor to arbitrate securities
claims puts him in a forum controlled by the securities industry. This result directly
contradicts the goal of both Securities Acts to free the investor from the control of the
market professionals. The Uniform Code provides some safeguards but despite them,
and indeed because of the background of the arbitrators, the investor has the impression,
frequently justified, that his claims are being judged by a forum composed of
individuals sympathetic to the securities industry and not drawn from the public. Id. at
260-61 (emphasis added). "The uniform opposition of investors to compelled
arbitration and the overwhelming support of the securities industry for the process
suggest that there must be some truth to the investors' belief that the securities industry
has an advantage in a forum under its own control." Id. at 261 (citing William
Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, at 8 (quoting
Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman, American Bar Association Task Force on Securities
Arbitration: "The houses basically like the present system because they own the stacked
deck.")); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953 (1986).
259. Joel E. Davidson, The Case for Mandatory Mediation of Securities Disputes,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1998, at 1. Indeed, the rigid cap rule proposed by the
Ruder Task Force "appears to be dead." Id.
260. Constantine N. Katsoris, Riding The Trojan Horse Back To Wilko?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, July 1999, at 1-3 [hereinafter Katsoris XVI].
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punitive damage caps which were not more restrictive than the rigid cap
rule. Thus, the NASD attempted to do indirectly through the permissive
cap rule what it originally sought unsuccessfully to do through its
moribund rigid cap rule. Unfortunately, the practical result to the public
would be the same.26'
0. SRO ARBITRATION FEES
Section 11 of the Code sets forth the schedule of fees and deposits
for arbitration, which can be specifically waived by a Director of
Arbitration. These fees have varied and generally increased over the
years.262 Most SROs have, to date, subsidized the arbitration process.
As the forums' costs increased, however, whispers were heard that SRO
arbitration should be put on a self-sustaining, pay-as-you-go basis. 263 If
that becomes a reality, arbitration no longer would be the relatively
inexpensive alternative to courtroom litigation where a lawsuit can be
filed at the courthouse for a relatively modest amount. Such escalation
of costs would surely fuel renewed efforts that securities claimants no
longer be subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and
that customers be free to pursue their claims in court.
R. LARGE AND COMPLEX CASES
Although the Uniform Code does not specifically deal with large
and complex cases, SICA revised its Procedures Booklets to describe
some additional services that are available at various SROs to deal with
such cases, including: requests for findings of fact and conclusions of
law; expedited hearings; the appointment of arbitrators with special
261. Id. Should the permissive cap rule be approved by the SEC, it is probable that
the entire securities industry would adopt it, for no General Counsel would subject his
or her firm to unnecessary exposure. Id.
262. The NASD was granted permission to increase its fees. See NASD Fee Hikes
and Increased Honoraria Approved by SEC, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Mar. 1999, at
13; NASD Regulation, Code of Arbitration Procedure, 47-50 (1999).
263. The NASD submitted a 19(b)(4) filing seeking SEC approval to spin off
arbitration to a wholly-owned and self-supporting subsidiary. Exchange Act Release
No. 34-41510 (June 10, 1999). Such a subsidiary company under the umbrella of the
NASD became operational as a separate company on July 9, 2000. NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc., THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Nov. 2000, at I.
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qualifications; and block-scheduling of hearing dates.264 Parties seeking
such special or additional services should advise the sponsoring SRO at
the earliest possible time.
S. TRACING UNIFORM CODE INTO SICA CODES
The Uniform Code of Arbitration represents a major step in the
development of securities arbitration as a fair, economical and
expeditious dispute resolution process. It also represents a significant
effort to make the securities arbitration rules of the various SROs
uniform throughout the country. It should be noted, however, that once
SICA adopts a new rule, each SRO generally returns to its respective
organization for Board approval; and, if successful, such rule is usually
then submitted to the SEC for approval in a Rule 19(b) filing. 65
Accordingly, there is often a time lag time between SICA's approval and
SRO action, with the result that the SRO codes do not always mirror the
SICA Code.266 Indeed, some sections of the Code have never been
adopted by the SROs. For example, no SRO code has adopted the SICA
requirement that the predispute arbitration clause be separately
initialed,2 67 nor has any SRO adopted SICA's rule that arbitrators may
grant "any relief they deem just and equitable. 26 s
Even more troublesome, however, is when SROs affirmatively by-
pass SICA and pursue significant rule changes on their own.2 69 This is
particularly unfortunate since through its public members, together with
the SEC's oversight role of the SROs, SICA appears to be the
264. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 523; see also ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note
133, at 48-66.
265. Katsoris II, supra note 14, at 364. Under section 19(b) of the 1934 Act, each
self-regulatory organization shall file with the SEC any proposed rule or change in the
rule of such self-regulatory organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). Moreover, no such "proposed rule change shall take effect unless approved by
the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection." Id.
266. Katsoris II, supra note 14, at 364.
267. UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 3(b); see SEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 23 (July 1991) (on file with author)
[hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT]; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
268. See UNIF. CODE, supra note 50, § 27(a); see also NYSE Symposium, supra note
194, at 1573.
269. See supra notes 94-98, 234-45 and accompanying text.
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mechanism with which most of the public seems comfortable.
Unfortunately, over the last decade, the NASD has often adopted a go-it-
alone policy,27 ° which not only undermines the credibility of the
Uniform Code, but also makes it difficult to track its provisions into the
various SRO codes.271 Moreover, inconsistencies among SRO rules
often lead to confusion and forum shopping and can constitute a trap for
the unwary.272
Certainly, there are areas where administrative variations among the
SRO codes and practices are understandable (such as whether a record
of the hearing should be recorded or transcribed).273 On more basic
issues, however, lone ranger actions by the SROs27 4 undermine the
creditability of SICA, confuse the users of the various forums, rekindle
suspicions about the process, and erode the confidence that is essential
to the integrity of a procedure that is basically compulsory.2 75
T. CONDUCT OF PARTICIPANTS
The Uniform Code of Arbitration establishes guidelines as to how
SRO arbitrations are to be conducted. Sound procedural rules, however,
in and of themselves do not necessarily insure a level playing field. To
insure fairness, you must also examine the administration of these rules
by the SROs, as well as the conduct of the participants in the arbitration
process (i.e., the parties, the lawyers, the witnesses, and the arbitrators).
The question thus becomes, who monitors the conduct of these various
participants?
270. Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA, Does The Bell Toll for Thee?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1994, at 1 (hereinafter Katsoris XVII]. For a tracking of the SICA
Code into the SRO codes as of 1996, see Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 565-66.
271. See Katsoris XVII, supra note 270, at 1; see also Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at
565-66; Robert S. Clemente, Road Map Comparing Arbitration at the NYSE, NASD,
ABA DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2000, at 24.
272. See Katsoris XVII, supra note 270.
273. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 250-61 and accompanying text.
275. See Katsoris VII, supra note 125. See also Mark Pullano, An Analysis of
NASD 's Proposal to Reorganize its Code of Arbitration Procedure, BLOOMBERG LAW
REPORTS, Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 2005, at 1. "[The NASD] has gone about proposing
revisions to its Code without the cooperation of SICA, and without soliciting input from
other SROs. It further appears that NASD was not motivated to make these changes at
the insistence of the staff at the SEC, or at least not by its public urging." Id.
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SRO personnel are supervised by their superiors at the SRO; and,
the SRO in turn is supervised by the SEC. Arbitrators' conduct is
monitored by the courts through appellate review, by the list selection
process, and through evaluation forms filled out and filed by the parties
with the SROs. That leaves the supervision of the parties, their lawyers
and witnesses.
Parties come to arbitration to resolve their disputes in an honest and
expeditious manner. They do not expect to be abused. The same is true
for all of the others who participate in the process. It is not unreasonable
that arbitrators and the host forum should expect a certain standard of
conduct on the part of the parties, their attorneys and witnesses that
appear before them. Indeed, as administrators of the process, they have
an inherent obligation to insure that unprofessional or uncivil conduct
does not affect the quality or outcome of the arbitration proceedings.276
Some attorneys seem to believe that a successful result justifies the
use of any form of advocacy and tactics, even at the expense of ethics
and civility. That is most unfortunate, and such tactics often backfire.
Arbitrators are never impressed by conduct that is unethical or uncivil.
Indeed, such misconduct detracts from and often taints a client's case.
Arbitrators have no difficulty in distinguishing between honest advocacy
and incivility; and, while they admire the former, they find the latter
distasteful.
Good advocacy is not only proper, it is expected. Indeed, it is the
duty of every lawyer not to leave a stone unturned in the representation
of their client. This representation, however, must be conducted
ethically and civilly. 277 Fortunately, unethical conduct is rare, but, when
discovered, should be addressed and dealt with promptly. How that is
handled depends upon the nature of the misconduct and the effect upon
276. See Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility
Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757 (2000).
277. Id. at 757 ("'We have much less of a sense of shared values than we used to
have. There was a common understanding of how you acted. You zealously
represented your client, but you had respect for the other side and treated them with
dignity. Afterward, you'd all go out for a drink.' Can we ever again achieve this level
of professionalism? I hope so.") (quoting Stephen C. Rice, President's Message: We
Need to Come Together as a Profession, ADVOCATE (Idaho), Jan. 1998, at 4 (quoting
Dean Haynsworth of William Mitchell College of Law)). See also Constantine N.
Katsoris, Farewell to Comrades-In-Arms, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Jan. 2000, at 4
[hereinafter Katsoris XVIII]; ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 133.
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the outcome of the case. It can vary, from a slap on the wrist to
reporting an attorney to the appropriate bar association, or might even
involve the imposition of some sort of sanction.2"8
There is no room in arbitration for incivility. Incivility, if
unchecked, often breeds more incivility, and can become very disruptive
to and even undermine the process. What constitutes uncivil conduct
can vary from such things as: constant unwarranted interruptions;
uncalled-for-rudeness and intimidation of witnesses; throwing
documents at an adversary, etc.279 We are generally not as concerned
with isolated incidents, particularly if malice does not appear to be
present. As a general rule, arbitrators will know incivility when they see
it, and if such misconduct is intentional, disruptive or repetitive, the
arbitrators must put a stop to it.
Moreover, incivility can take on many forms and be injected in
various ways and at all stages of the proceedings, for example: not only
against opposing parties and their attorneys, but also against witnesses,
SRO arbitration staff, and occasionally even against the arbitrators
themselves.280 If allowed to continue, at the very least it renders the
proceedings extremely unpleasant, often leads to delay, and on occasion,
might even prejudice the outcome of the proceedings. Arbitrators
simply cannot allow this.
Arbitrators must be fair and impartial. On the other hand, they
should not permit incivility in the proceedings over which they are
presiding. What can an arbitration panel do to prevent incivility from
occurring or recurring? It depends upon the circumstances. For
example, it can vary from calling numerous short recesses while
counsel, witnesses and others regain their composure; or, in a most
egregious case, even dismissing the proceedings without prejudice; or,
imposing sanctions, depending upon the source, seriousness and/or
malice of the misconduct.81 Ironically, it is often the malfeasor-
278. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Advocacy With Civility: A Prescription for
Success, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Jan. 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Katsoris XIX]. See also
Jisook Lee, Disciplinary Referrals, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Oct. 2005, at 1.
279. See Katsoris XIX, supra note 278, at 1.
280. Id.
281. Indeed, the NASD has recently proposed in Rule 12211 that the sanction power
of arbitrators not only be applied to parties, but to their representatives as well. See
David E. Robbins, What New Customer Arbitration Code Will Mean to Arbitrators,
THE NEUTRAL CORNER, June 2004, at 1.
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whose conduct disrupts and delays the proceedings - who complains
that the hearings are taking too long.282
An attorney or party who is a victim of such unethical or uncivil
conduct by an adversary should not hesitate to bring it to the attention of
the arbitrators. It is then up to the arbitrators to do their utmost to insure
that the proceedings are fair to all sides. By the same token, such
control over the proceedings can and should be asserted, when possible,
with civility. Little is usually gained by asserting such control in an
uncivil manner.
In the final analysis, the duty of insuring civility historically falls
upon the Chairperson. On the other hand, if the Chairperson fails in this
role, then it is incumbent upon the other arbitrators to step forward.
Indeed, if the Chairperson cannot control the proceeding over which he
or she is presiding, perhaps they should not be reappointed as
Chairperson in the future.2" 3
U. JOINT ADMINISTRA TION
Section 23(e) of the Code now permits the parties to agree to jointly
administer the arbitration proceedings without the further assistance of
the SRO. This procedure is available only with the consent of the
parties and the arbitrators, and sets out a list of procedural rules that
must be followed. Although this option has some advantages,
particularly in long and complicated cases, it is doubtful that it will
become the procedure of choice in the vast majority of cases either
because of reluctance on some of the participants to agree, or an
underlying apprehension that by increasing the direct contact with the
arbitrators the opportunity for mischief is increased. Accordingly,
although the procedure has significant merit, it should be used only in
the right type of case, preferably involving only seasoned and
experienced arbitrators who are likely to seek increased compensation
because of their undertaking of additional administrative duties.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SRO ARBITRATION
The McMahon decision transformed SRO arbitration from a
282. See Katsoris XIX, supra note 278.
283. Id.
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basically voluntary procedure to a largely mandatory one.284 Since then,
the debate has focused upon whether or not it is fair to compel the public
to arbitrate their disputes before an SRO forum.285 As an alternative to
returning to a largely voluntary system as it existed before McMahon, it
has been suggested that: (i) the SRO forums be replaced by a separate
independent non-SRO forum to host these disputes; or (ii) alternative
providers be permitted to compete with the SRO arbitration forums.
2 86
A. SINGLE INDEPENDENT FORUM
As SRO arbitration filings exploded and the issues became more
complex, the rules of combat became more litigious and complaints
surfaced that securities arbitration had lost its way, becoming less
economical and speedy, and more like the courthouse it was designed to
avoid. In 1994, both the NYSE and the NASD announced plans to
address the troublesome issues then facing SRO arbitrations. The NYSE
held a two-day symposium where these issues were openly debated by a
wide spectrum of leading experts in the field; and, based upon such
discussions, issued recommendations in the form of a Report.287
The NASD sought to calm the troubled waters in a different way.
In the fall of 1994, the NASD announced the formation of an Arbitration
Task Force (Ruder Task Force or Task Force) to explore and propose
broad reforms to the NASD arbitration process. The Task Force was
headed by Professor David S. Ruder, former Chairman of the SEC, and
included practitioners and academics with strong backgrounds in
arbitration, business and public interest law.288 The Task Force's
284. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
285. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 159 BROOK. L.
REv. 1113 (1993) [hereinafter Katsoris XX]; Peter R. Celia, Letters to the Editor, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1997, at 9 ("If brokerage employees are entitled to a choice
of forum for the full and fair enforcement of their rights, how can you deny the same
right to the public investors without whom there would be no securities industry?"); See
also Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities
Industry, 78 B.U. L. REv. 255 (1998); Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631 (2005).
286. See infra notes 302-06 and accompanying text.
287. See NYSE Symposium, supra note 194 and accompanying text.
288. See Michael Siconolfi, Revised Rules Are Mapped For Securities Arbitration,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at Cl ("Members of the task force represent a cross section
of arbitration specialists, including Steve Hammerman, Vice Chairman at Merrill Lynch
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mission was to study the factors impacting the arbitration process with a
view to improving its efficiency and trimming its costs. Numerous
closed sessions were held at which various witnesses appeared,
including the Public Members of SICA.289 Basically, the topics delved
into by the Task Force were similar to those discussed at the NYSE
Symposium and in the NYSE Report that followed.
In January 1996, the NASD Task Force issued the Ruder Report,
which was over 150 pages in length and contained scores of
recommendations,29 ° including several on SRO funding and governance,
namely: (i) the NASD Arbitration Department receive whatever
resources are necessary to manage caseload growth and to implement
the Report's recommendations; (ii) such increased expenditures should
be borne primarily by the NASD and its member firms; and, (iii) that the
arbitration function be administered as independently as is practicable. 91
Indeed, the Public Members of SICA had previously pressed for many
of these goals both at SICA and also when they appeared before the
Task Force. Independence and proper funding for the SRO forums is
essential, for even the fairest rules will not guarantee justice if forum
independence is suspect or funding for their operation and
implementation is inadequate.292
The Ruder Report also recommended that consideration be given to
the establishment of a single forum within an existing SRO.293 In
contrast, SICA once considered the creation of a single independent
forum to administer (with SEC oversight) all securities arbitrations
& Co.; J. Boyd Page of Page & Bacek, an Atlanta law firm representing investors;
Frank Spalding, former Chairman of the NASD's National Arbitration Committee; and
John Bachmann, managing principal at Edward D. Jones & Co."). See also Ruder
Report, supra note 194.
289. James Beckley, Peter Cella, Justin Klein and the author, the then Public
Members of SICA, appeared before the Ruder Task Force on January 16, 1995.
290. See also Ruder Report, supra note 194.
291. Id. at 138-56. In addition, the Ruder Report also suggested, inter alia: (i)
changing the method of screening arbitrators from the then existing method, where the
forum selects the panel, to one in which the parties themselves choose the arbitrators
from supplied lists; (ii) establishing a mandatory list of discoverable items; and (iii)
eliminating of the so-called Six Year Rule which automatically bars consideration of a
claim if more than six years have elapsed. Id.
292. Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 532-33.
293. Id. at 533.
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involving the public.294 While SICA ultimately decided it would not
pursue that course because it was not evident that material economies of
scale would result from a single forum, it concluded that it would
continue to explore alternative methods of improving the governance
and image of SRO arbitration.295
Once the Uniform Code had been extensively updated after
McMahon, some suggested that SICA's usefulness had diminished, 96
and it be replaced by a system whereby all the SROs collapse their
public arbitration programs into one, leaving the public securities
arbitration function solely to one SRO, such as the NASD.297  That
suggestion, however, does not solve the nagging perception of the
SROs' close association to the securities industry, thus lacking the
structural independence necessary to insure public confidence.298
To date, the SEC has opposed the idea of a single forum, preferring
the competitive choices offered by the various SROs.299 Perhaps a truly
independent single forum is a Utopian dream; but, until such a forum
can be created, the SEC's theory of competitive forces is preferable,
particularly in an atmosphere where arbitration is basically mandatory.
Until then, the present system of checks and balances - in place for
over 25 years - has worked relatively well. It has resulted in steady
and meaningful change from the balkanized procedures of the past. It
also has prevented some ill-conceived ideas from finding their way into
294. NYSE Symposium, supra note 194, at 1643; see also Philip J. Hoblin, The
Case for a Single Securities and Commodities Arbitration Forum, COMMODITIES
LETTER 3, 5 (Aug. 1989); Katsoris I, supra note 3, at 384-5 ("A single independent
forum entails exactly what it indicates - a forum independent from actual, inferential,
subtle, practical or any kind of imaginable pressure. The forum should be independent
of the industry, independent of the plaintiff's bar, and other than the SECs general
oversight role, independent of that regulatory body.") (emphasis added).
295. See Hoblin, supra note 7, at 3, 5.
296. See Katsoris XX, supra note 285, at 1152; Feedback, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1993, at 2, 6. This possibility was also raised by the Ruder
Report. See supra note 194.
297. See Katsoris XX, supra note 285, at 1152. See also Roberta S. Karmel, Should
There Be a Single SRO?, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1999, at 3.
298. See NYSE Symposium, supra note 194, at 1592. See also Katsoris XX, supra
note 285, at 1152.
299. See NYSE Symposium, supra note 194, at 1649. It is noteworthy, however,
that the number of SRO arbitration forums has dwindled. See supra note 32.
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the securities arbitration process.3 °0
Under the present system, SICA, an independent body, proposes
rule changes. The respective SRO boards then review them and, if they
approve, file them with the SEC. The SEC then approves or
disapproves, usually after allowing interested parties the opportunity to
comment thereon. By that time, all participants have had at least two
bites at the apple: the public at the SICA level and during the comment
period of the 19(b) filing; the various SROs at the SICA level and before
their respective boards; the industry at the SICA level, at the SRO level
(where it lobbies intensely) and again during the comment period of the
19(b) filing; and the SEC at the SICA level (where SEC representatives
and others are invited guests) and as the final word on the 19(b) filing.
This pattern for rule changes in securities arbitration should be preserved
so long as the present mandatory SRO system remains.3 '
B. ALTERNATIVE PILOT PROGRAM
Many investors sign a customer agreement, when they open a
securities account at a brokerage firm, which contains a clause providing
300. See supra notes 94-98, 251-60 and accompanying text.
301. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 536; see also Katsoris X, supra note 245, at
361. As for continuing the role of SICA, it is noteworthy that in the majority opinion in
McMahon, Justice O'Connor reflected upon the previous mistrust of arbitration as
follows: "[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that
time. This is expressly so in light of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure
of the securities laws." 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987) (emphasis added). It is respectfully
suggested that the single most important event bridging the Supreme Court's mistrust
expressed in Wilko and its confidence evidenced in McMahon was the creation of SICA
in 1977. Similarly, in a dissenting opinion in McMahon, Justice Blackmun observed:
It is true that arbitration procedures in the securities industry have improved since
Wilko's day. Of particular importance has been the development of a code of
arbitration by the Commission with the assistance of representatives of the securities
industry and the public ....
This code has been used to harmonize the arbitration procedure among SROs.
Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 279, 283-84 (1984) (Katsoris). As the Commission explained: This [Code]
marks a substantial improvement over the various arbitration procedures currently
being utilized by the securities industry and represents an important step towards
establishing a uniform system for resolving investor complaints through arbitration.
SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16390 (Nov. 30, 1979). 44 FED. REG. 70616, 70617.
Id. at 258, 257 n.16 (emphasis added).
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that any disputes regarding their account be resolved by arbitration at
one of the SROs. In order to provide customers with a broader choice of
arbitration forums other than SROs, several years ago SICA proposed a
two-year pilot program where they may resolve disputes with their
brokerage firm at non-SRO forums. SICA developed guidelines for the
pilot program. The guidelines provided for the voluntary participation
of brokerage firms who would designate one or more non-SRO forums
where customers may file a claim. The choice of whether to go to a
non-SRO forum was up to the customer. The guidelines also set forth
minimum due process requirements that the non-SRO forums must meet
to be eligible for the pilot program. Seven of the largest retail brokerage
firms volunteered to participate in the pilot program involving two non-
SRO forums.3 °2 Collectively the firms agreed to arbitrate to award a
minimum of 100 cases at the non-SRO forums during the two-year
pilot.30 3
Beginning September 1, 1999, a customer who had a dispute with
one of the participating firms could choose to arbitrate at a non-SRO
forum. Customers whose claims qualified under the pilot program could
file directly with the non-SRO forum selected by the firm. Customers
who filed a claim with an SRO against one of the seven participating
firms would be advised, if the claim qualified, that they may arbitrate the
dispute at the non-SRO forum. The customer could then choose whether
to proceed at that non-SRO forum or remain at the SRO forum.
In order for a claim to have qualified for the pilot, the events giving
rise to the dispute must have occurred less than four years before the
date the Pilot Program commenced or six years before filing, whichever
302. Stephen G. Sneeringer, Securities Arbitration Pilot Program, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Jan. 2000, at 1. The two non-SRO forums are the AAA and JAMS;
and, the seven participating securities firms are: Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, Paine Webber, Prudential Securities, Salomon Smith Barney, A.G. Edwards,
and Raymond James. Id. Because the program is voluntary and a matter of contract, it
does not seem to require SEC approval to be implemented. See NASD To Enforce
Settlement and Decisions From All Forums, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, May 1999, at 8.
303. Since most cases settle before the arbitrators issue an award, the actual number
of cases eligible for the pilot program may be significantly higher. Whether this
number of non-SRO filings will be reached was speculative in view of the anticipated
increased cost at said forums. See Lisa I. Fried, New Arbitration Pilot Program for
Securities Brokers, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 2000, at 5 ("Arbitration fees, which are
frequently split between the parties, range from $200 to $400 per hour at JAMS, and
$700 to $1,100 per day at AAA."). See also Sneeringer, supra note 302, at 1.
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was shorter. Disputes involving limited partnerships and disputes
naming registered representatives or non-participating firms were not
eligible for the pilot program unless the registered representative or non-
participating firm consented to arbitration at the non-SRO forum. Nor
were claims involving pro se claimants eligible for the pilot program.30 4
Unfortunately, this SICA-sponsored pilot program, aimed at
encouraging investors and their counsel to choose outside arbitration,
produced little positive response.30 5 Indeed, it would appear that most
eligible participants were more concerned with the cost of non-SRO
arbitration and were more comfortable with their familiarity with SRO
procedures.30 6
C. BACK TO COURT
Should access to the courts be made available to securities
claimants similar to the manner allowed before Shearson American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon?30  One of the principal attractions for such
access (whether limited or not) would be to counter the argument that
claimants should not be forced to arbitrate in forums controlled by SROs
(even though they allegedly agreed to do so).308 Indeed, permitting such
alternative access to the courts has considerable merit and appeal, and
would help defuse the escalating tension regarding the selection and
qualification of arbitrators. Unfortunately, however, there is no free
lunch; and such re-entry to the courts would trigger a ripple effect.
By freeing claimants from the yoke of mandatory contractual
arbitration, the industry would surely counter- in the interest of
maintaining a level playing field - that it too should then be similarly
304. Admittedly, the cost of arbitration at these alternate forums would be greater
than at SRO forums and SICA did not feel pro se litigants would benefit from
participating in the pilot program in its initial stages. See also Fried, supra note 303, at
5.
305. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, FINAL REPORT,
PILOT PROGRAM FOR NON-SRO SPONSORED ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVE (2002) (on file
with author).
306. Id. See also Stephen G. Sneeringer, A SICA Experiment, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Nov. 2002, at 1-2.
307. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
308. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 534. See also Jonathan C. Uretsky,
Securities Arbitration vis-6-vis Securities Litigation: To Be or Not to Be, BLOOMBERG
LAW REPORTS, Vol. 2, No. 2. at 1.
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freed from the mandatory obligation to arbitrate, which is presently
imposed by the SROs upon its members (whether there is an agreement
to arbitrate or not).309
Moreover, flooding the courts with thousands of securities disputes
would saddle the courts, claimants, and respondents with additional
costs and delays. In addition, depending on the extent and manner in
which access to the courts was allowed, the troublesome
intertwining/bifurcation dilemma of having similar facts being
simultaneously tried before different tribunals could resurface.310
Furthermore, once the exclusivity of the arbitration remedy is
breached, we will probably gradually drift towards a significantly
weaker SRO arbitration system where interest and resources in
maintaining a level playing field will wane over time; for, instead of
being constantly vigilant to insure that the playing field does not tilt one
way or the other, complacency will reappear and a "let's fix it" attitude
will be replaced by "if you don't like the rules, why don't you go to
court." In this regard, I might add that it was only after McMahon that
most of the belt-tightening in SRO arbitration occurred.3 1 '
In any event, it is this author's opinion that most claimants would
still opt to stay within the SRO system because of its informality,
finality, speed of resolution and collectability of awards, and familiarity
with basically one set of nationwide rules. This would be particularly
true regarding the law school clinics where continuity of same-student
representation is short-lived through the attrition of graduation, making
speed and simplicity all that more important.
V. MEDIATION
Mediation of securities disputes provides parties with a voluntary,
non-adversarial, and informal process that can often result in the
309. SROs require by rule that their membership consent to arbitrate disputes with
their customers. See Hoblin, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES,
Case 1-2 (1988), at 2-3 to 2-4. By belonging to the SRO, its members agree to be
bound by the SRO's rules. Consequently, customers of an SRO may compel a member
of an SRO to arbitrate; however, absent a written contract, the member cannot compel
the customer to arbitrate. Id.
310. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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resolution of a dispute with a minimal expenditure of time and money.312
It is a voluntary process in which parties present their positions to a
neutral third party, a mediator, in an attempt to reach a mutually
acceptable resolution of their dispute.3" 3 Mediation is voluntary, and
thus the parties are free to withdraw from mediation at any time.314
Mediation differs from arbitration in several ways. Unlike
arbitration, mediation usually is non-binding. 35 Thus, a mediator cannot
force parties to settle their disputes.?16 If the parties cannot reach a
resolution of their dispute through mediation, they may proceed either in
arbitration or in court.3 17 Mediation is also usually more informal,
speedier and less expensive than arbitration, and attempts to assist the
parties in reaching an acceptable resolution of their dispute.318
Mediation helps parties focus on their dispute and better define the
issues that need to be resolved. When parties attempt to settle disputes
on their own, they often lose sight of the real issues in dispute as
personal feelings, hostile attitudes, and misunderstandings get in the
way.319 A mediator can also help the parties by giving an unbiased view
of the case, and by discussing with each party the merits, or lack thereof,
of their positions. Finally, a mediator can be a source of creative
resolutions to a problem that the parties may never have had on their
own.
320
312. J. Boyd Page et al., The Role of Mediation and Early Evaluation in Facilitating
Settlement Negotiations, PLI/SEC. ARB., Vol. 2: Course Handbook Series No. B-899, at
60 (1995). See also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for
Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 47 (1996).
313. Nolan-Haley, supra note 312.
314. Roger M. Deitz, Understanding Function, Use of Mediation, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12,
1999, at 9. But see Joel E. Davidson, The Case For Mandatory Mediation Of Securities
Disputes, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1998, at 1.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. J. Boyd Page et al., supra note 312, at 61; see also Joel Davidson & Romaine
L. Gardner, Mediation: The Best Surprise Is No Surprise, ABA Section of Litigation,
SECURITIES NEWS, Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 1997, at 8.
318. Davidson & Gardner, supra note 317, at 8; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Beyond Arbitration: Improvement and Evolution in the United States Construction
Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 65, 94 (1996).
319. J. Boyd Page et al., supra note 312, at 61; see also Davidson & Gardner, supra
note 317, at 8; John D. Feerick, The Peace-Making Role of a Mediator, 19 OHIO ST. J.
DisP. RESOL. 229.
320. Davidson & Gardner, supra note 317, at 8. See also Model Standards of
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With greater frequency, mediation is being sought at all stages of
the dispute, even after hearings have begun; and that flexibility is to be
encouraged. Indeed, both the NASD and the NYSE have successfully
instituted and have been operating a growing mediation program in
securities arbitrations for several years.32'
VI. CONCLUSION
At its inception in 1977, SICA consisted of ten SROs, three Public
Members, and a representative of the SIA. At that time, trades were
generally executed at fixed commission rates, pursuant to a specialist
system, the DJIA hovered at about 1,000 and the daily volume on the
NYSE averaged about 21 million shares. Much has changed in the last
three decades. Presently, only four of the original SICA SROs have
active arbitration programs, the others have either discontinued their
arbitration programs or receive few, if any, claims. Despite its shrinking
SRO membership, however, the work of SICA is as important as ever,
as indicated by the significant increase in claim filings over the years.
Mediation, as a prelude to or even during an arbitration or litigation,
is an option to be encouraged. Fair settlements arrived at through
mediation can avoid the delay, expense, collateral damage and trauma of
courtroom litigation or SRO arbitration. Thus, every effort should be
made to explore the use of mediation, where the results to date have
been quite favorable.322
No one can predict what the averages of the various markets will be
a decade from now, and one can only surmise what new technologies
Conduct for Mediators Endorsed by AAA, ABA, and SPIDR, 6 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP., No. 10, at 215 (Oct. 1995); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers,
Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1369.
321. J. Boyd Page et al., supra note 312, at 62; see also Katsoris V, supra note 92, at
476 n.415; Getting Serious about Mediation, An Interview with Kenneth L. Andrichick,
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1995, at 9-10; A Great Beginningfor NASD Mediation
Program, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Dec. 1995, at 1; Mediation Celebrates Fourth
Anniversary, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Nov. 1999, at 1; NYSE Rules Package Places
NYSE Arbitration Program on Competitive Par with NASD, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
Dec. 1998, at 9. See also SRO Mediation Statistics attached hereto as appendix C.
322. See SRO Forum Statistics, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Apr. 1999, at 9 (In 1997
and 1998, over 2,000 cases were closed by the NASD's Office of Dispute Resolution
after utilizing the mediation process and approximately 80% of said cases ended in
settlement.). See also SRO Mediation Statistics attached hereto as appendix C.
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will drive future trading, or what new competitors and products will
surface.323 One thing is certain, however, and that is that disputes will
continue to arise between the securities industry and the public. In
resolving such future disputes with the securities industry, the public
will not accept a mandatory arbitration system where its rights and
remedies are stripped unilaterally, or limited by a non-negotiated pre-
dispute arbitration agreement.3 24 Simply put, whatever relief is available
in court should generally also be available in arbitration. That was the
mandate of McMahon.32 5
323. See Dominic Bencivenga, SEC Takes Solomonic Approach to Regulation, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 30, 1998, at 5; see also Rebecca Buckman, Island ECN Raises Capital to
Become a Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1999, at C20; Diana B. Henriques,
Testing an Emerging Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at Cl; Diana B. Henriques,
Big Board to Speed Plansfor Evening Sessions, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at C4; Greg
Ip, Firms Create Systems as Rivals to Big Board, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1999, at C1.
Indeed, the volatility of future markets will no doubt be complicated by the widespread
use of derivatives and expanded trading of foreign securities in foreign currency
denominations. Mitchell Pacelle & Randall Smith, Long Term Capital Prepares for
New Era, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 21, 1999, at 18 ("After outsized investment gains
early in its life, Long Term Capital nearly collapsed in the autumn, as bad trading debts
wiped out more than 90% of its value. The carnage exacerbated panicked selling in
global bond, stock, and currency markets."); ECB Moves To Brake Yen's Rise, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., June 19-20, 1999, at 9; see also James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory
Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 58, 60 (1994).
See also The Tremors from Two Trading Titans, Bus. WK., May 9, 2005, at 82; Taking
Risk To Extremes, Bus. WK., May 23, 2005.
324. See Katsoris IV, supra note 24, at 536.
325. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text; see also William J. Fitzpatrick,
Beware of Greeks Bearing Myths, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1999, at 1;
Constantine N. Katsoris, The Trojan Horse: Love It or Leave It, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Katsoris XXI]. The Trojan Horse article
also alleges that the conventional wisdom after McMahon was that an investor should
obtain in arbitration whatever relief was available in court. Not only is that my opinion,
but, as I outlined in footnote 34 (in over 20 lines and over 200 words) of my article, The
Betrayal of McMahon, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 229 (1997), that is the opinion of
several other highly respected commentators. As far as Bill's rejection of the adhesion
argument, I think that serious commentators would wince at the implication that the
industry - through the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements - can dictate the
terms of dispute resolution, no matter how unfair or unreasonable. My understanding of
adhesion contracts is that it is a cumulative thing and, sooner or later, the industry will
add one condition too many, such as the punitive damage cap, which in effect will be
the final straw that breaks the camel's back. Now that I have introduced the camel to
the Trojan Horse, I feel I have said enough.
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On the other hand, indiscriminately throwing thousands of cases
back to congested court calendars is certainly no panacea. In such a
scenario, the parties would often be plagued by excessive litigation
costs, which either directly or indirectly would be ultimately borne by
the public as the industry's cost of doing business. Moreover, the public
would often be denied justice because of the excessive costs and delays
associated with courtroom litigation.326  Yet, the present mandatory
process will work only so long as the playing field is not only perceived
to be, but also in fact remains level for all.
To this end, SICA's independent stabilizing influence, together
with the SEC's oversight role, continues to generate investor confidence
in the SRO arbitration system. Indeed, SICA's very presence during
these past three decades, like the cop on the beat, has been reassuring to
the regulators, the courts, and the public.327 To continue to be effective
in this role, however, we must be ever vigilant that SICA remains a
beacon of independent thought, whose ultimate goal is to maintain a
level playing field.
My principal concern going forward is that we do not backslide into
a system of Balkanization, as existed before the creation of SICA, where
practitioners had to contend with the diverse rules and procedures of the
various state courts, federal courts, and SROs throughout the country -
each of which often spoke in a different language, reminiscent of the
biblical Tower of Babel.
Our securities markets are the envy of the world, both because of
their relative stability and because the degree and quality of disclosure
required for registration thereon is generally higher than is required
elsewhere. To insure the stability of such markets, however, we must
retain the public's confidence - confidence in the markets themselves
and confidence that, should a dispute arise, it will be fairly resolved.32 8
"This confidence, however, can only be earned by maintaining a de
326. See Business Cases Clog Courts, 17 NAT. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 1; see also
Arleen Jacobius, California Three-Strikes Law Gobbling Up Jurors, 81 DEC. A.B.A. J.
29(1995).
327. See Katsoris XX, supra note 285.
328. See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 134, at 6. See also notes 135-38 and
accompanying text; David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital
Formation Needs After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REv. 39;
Barbara Black & Jill Gross, The Elusive Balance Between Investor Protection and
Wealth Creation, 26 PACE L. REv. 27.
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facto as well as a de jure image of fairness. 3 29 In the final analysis,
however, we can never become complacent and feel as though we have
achieved the perfect dispute resolution system. In a less-than-perfect
world, "[]aws and institutions are constantly tending to gravitate...
[and] [l]ike clocks, they must be occasionally cleansed and wound up,
and set to true time., 330 This will be particularly true in the future as the
landscape changes to reflect the trend towards: electronic trading;
consolidation and mergers of markets, exchanges and SROs; and the
transformation of SROs from being not-for-profit entities to those
organized for profit.33'
329. Constantine N. Katsoris, Statement Before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 8, 1977); see also Katsoris XX, supra note 285, at 1154; James E.
Buck, Statement of the New York Stock Exchange before the Securities Exchange
Commission Hearing on Release Number 34-12974, at 5 (Feb. 9, 1977) (testimony of
Secretary of NYSE urging the creation of SICA). See also Susanne Craig & John
Hechinger, Wall Street's Dispute Process Is Under Fire, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2004, at
C1. See also SRO Mediation Statistics attached hereto as appendix C.
330. Henry Ward Beecher, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (1858) (emphasis added).
331. See A Big Exchange: NYSE Members Approve Deal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2005,
at Cl. See also One Regulator - One SRO Forum?, SEC. ARB. ALERT, 2005-46, Nov.
30, 2005, at 2; NYSE-Archipelago: What Becomes of PCX Arbitration?, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Nov. 2005, at 5; Exchanges, Good Times Rarely Last, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 3-9, 2005, at 69; Aaron Lucchetti, Street Debates Oversight of the
New NYSE, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2006, at C3.
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Section 1: Arbitration
This section covers who may file an arbitration claim and which parties
are required to submit to arbitration. It also covers those types of claims
that may not be appropriate for arbitration.
(a) Who must submit to arbitration.
(1) Members and associated persons must arbitrate a claim under
the Constitution and Rules of an SRO if:
- the claim concerns the business activities of the member; and
- arbitration is requested by a customer or non-member.
Allied members, member organizations and associated persons
are also required to submit to arbitration.
(2) Customers or non-members may be required to arbitrate a
claim under the Constitution and Rules of an SRO if:
- the claim concerns the business activities of the member; and
- arbitration is required by a written agreement.
(b) When arbitration is not appropriate.
The [SRO] may choose not to accept a claim for arbitration if the
subject matter of the claim is not proper for arbitration, given the
purposes of the [SRO] and the arbitration rules.
(c) Claims from a specific market.
Several SROs offer arbitration programs. A SRO may refer a
claim to the arbitration forum for a specific market if:
- that market where the transactions took place is identifiable;
and
- the Claimant agrees to the referral.
(d) Class Action Claims.
(1) Class action claims will not be arbitrated under this Code.
(2) Any claim that is included in a court-certified class action or a
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putative class action or is ordered by a court for arbitration at a
non-SRO for class-wide arbitration will not be arbitrated under
this code.
If a party can show that it is not participating in the class
action, or has withdrawn from the class according to any
conditions set by the court, the claim is eligible for arbitration
under this Code.
The Director of Arbitration ("Director") will refer to a panel of
arbitrators any dispute as to whether a claim is part of a class
action unless either party petitions the court hearing the class
action to resolve the dispute. The petition must be filed with
the court within 10 business days of receipt of notice that the
dispute is being referred to a panel of arbitrators.
(3) A member or associated person may not try to enforce any
arbitration agreement against a member of a putative or
certified class action until:
- the class certification is denied;
- the class is decertified;
- that person is excluded from the class by the court; or
- that person decides not to participate in the class or
withdraws from the class.
(4) No person waives any rights under this Code or under any
agreement except as stated in this paragraph.
Section 2. Agreement to Arbitrate
This Code is part of every agreement to arbitrate under the Constitution
and Rules of the [SRO] and is incorporated by reference into all
arbitration agreements.
Section 3. Requirements When Using Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements With Customers
(a) Member organizations must highlight any pre-dispute arbitration
clause and immediately precede it by the following disclosure
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language, in outline form as shown here, that must also be
highlighted:
(1) Arbitration is final and binding on the parties.
(2) The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court,
including the right to jury trial.
(3) Pre-arbitration discovery is generally more limited than and
different from court proceedings.
(4) The arbitrators' award is not required to include factual
findings or legal reasoning and any party's right to appeal or to
seek modification of rulings by the arbitrators is strictly
limited.
(5) The panel of arbitrators will typically include a minority of
arbitrators who were or are affiliated with the securities
industry.
(b) Member organizations must include a highlighted statement,
immediately before the signature line, that the agreement contains
a pre-dispute arbitration clause, and state where the clause is
located. The customer must separately initial the statement.
(c) The member organization must give a copy of the agreement with
the arbitration clause to the customer, who must acknowledge its
receipt on the agreement or on a separate document.
(d) The agreement may not include any condition that limits or
contradicts:
(1) the rules of any SRO;
(2) the ability of a party to file a claim in arbitration; or
(3) the ability of the arbitrators to make an award.
(e) All agreements shall include a statement that "No person shall
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bring a putative or certified class action to arbitration, nor seek to
enforce any pre-dispute arbitration agreement against any person
who has initiated in court a putative class action; who is a member
of a putative class who has not opted out of the class with respect
to any claims encompassed by the putative class action until: (i)
the class certification is denied; or (ii) the class is decertified; or
(iii) the customer is excluded from the class by the court. Such
forbearance to enforce an agreement to arbitrate shall not
constitute a waiver of any rights under this agreement except to the
extent stated herein."
(f) The requirements of subsection (e) will apply only to new
agreements signed by an existing or new customer of a member or
member organization after one year has elapsed from the date of
Commission approval.
Section 4. Representation in Arbitration
(a) Representation by a Party.
Parties may represent themselves in an arbitration held in a United
States hearing location.
(b) Representation by an Attorney.
At any stage of the arbitration proceeding held in a United States
hearing location, all parties shall have the right to be represented
by an attorney admitted to practice law in any state of the United
States, the District of Columbia, any commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States, or foreign country. A member of
a partnership may represent the partnership; and a bona fide
officer of a corporation, trust, or association may represent the
corporation, trust, or association.
(c) Qualifications of Representative.
Issues regarding the qualifications of a person to represent a party
in arbitration are governed by applicable law or bar regulations
and may be determined by an appropriate court or other regulatory
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agency. In the absence of a court order, the arbitration proceeding
shall not be stayed or otherwise delayed pending resolution of
such issues.
(d) Assistance by a Non-Attorney.
Parties may be assisted by a person who is not an attorney (such as
a business associate, friend, or relative), if that person is not
receiving compensation for services rendered in representing the
party, and the representation does not violate the laws of the state
in which the arbitration is scheduled to be held.
Sections 4(a) and (b) amended, and sections 4(c) and (d) added June 23, 2005
Section 5. Tolling time limitations for filing a claim in court or
arbitration
(a) If the law permits, when a claimant files a signed submission
agreement, the time limits that would ordinarily run for filing a
claim in court will be tolled. Tolling will continue while the SRO
retains jurisdiction.
(b) When the parties have submitted the claim to a court, the 6-year
time limit to submit a claim to arbitration will not run, while the
court retains jurisdiction.
Section 6. Filing and Service Requirements
The parties may file documents with the Director and serve the other
parties by first-class mail, overnight mail, or other means. Filing and
Service are accomplished on the date of mailing either by first class or
overnight mail or, in the case of other means of service, on the date of
delivery. The parties must file documents with the Director on the same
day as service on the parties.
Section 7. Starting an Arbitration
This section covers how to start an arbitration, how to answer a claim,
and the time periods for filing and service of documents. It also covers
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when a party will not be allowed to defend against a claim, and the
procedure to add third parties. If the claim for damages is $25,000 or
less, see Section 9 B Simplified Arbitration.
(a) Initial Filing Requirements.
Claimant must submit to the Director, with copies for each party
and each arbitrator:
- a Submission Agreement, signed by Claimant;
- a Statement of Claim, specifying relevant facts and remedies
requested;
- the non-refundable filing fee and deposit specified in Section 11;
and
- documents supporting the claim.
The Director will send the Respondent the Submission Agreement
and the Statement of Claim.
(b) Answer and Counterclaim Requirements.
(1) Requirements Generally. Within 20 business days of receipt of
the Statement of Claim, the Respondent must serve each party
with a signed Submission Agreement; and an Answer to the
claim. At the same time, Respondent must file the signed
Submission Agreement and Answer with the Director, with
additional copies for the arbitrators.
(2) Content of the Answer. The Answer must include all available
defenses and facts to be relied upon at the hearing. The
Answer may also include:
- any related counterclaims;
- any cross-claims against another Respondent; and
- any third-party claims.
If an answer contains a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party claim, the Respondent must submit the non-refundable
filing fee and deposit as specified in Section 11 with the
answer.
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(3) Answering Counterclaims. Claimant must answer any
counterclaim within 10 business days of receipt. The answer
must comply with paragraph (2) above. Claimant must serve
the answer on each party and file a copy with the Director,
with copies for each Arbitrator.
(4) Third-Party Claims. To initiate a Third-Party Claim, a party
must:
- serve each party with a copy of the Third-Party Claim;
- file a copy with the Director, with copies for each Arbitrator;
and
- pay the non-refundable filing fee and hearing deposit as
specified in Section 11.
(5) Answering Third Party Claims. Third-Party Respondents must
answer the claim as specified in (1) and (2) above.
(6) Loss of the Right to Defend.
(a) Upon objection of a party, the Arbitrator(s) may bar a party
from presenting defenses or other facts at the hearing if:
- the answer to any claim contains only a general denial,
without reference to the facts; or
- available defenses or relevant facts are not specified in
the answer;
(b) Upon objection of a party or at its discretion, the panel may
bar a party from presenting defenses or other facts at the
hearing if the party does not file a timely answer.
(7) Extending Time Periods. The Director may extend any of the
above time periods.
Section 8. Joining and Consolidating Claims for Multiple Parties
This section covers when multiple parties may start an arbitration or be
named as respondents in an arbitration.
(a) Multiple Claimants.
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Several claimants may join together in one arbitration if their
claims:
- contain common questions of law or fact, common to all the
parties; and
- arise out of the same event, transaction, or series of events or
transactions.
Each Claimant is not required to seek the same relief demanded by
the other Claimants.
Each Claimant may receive an award based on that Claimant's
individual right to relief.
(b) Multiple Respondents.
A Claimant may join separate Respondents into one arbitration if
the claims against the Respondents:
- contain common questions of law or fact common to all the
parties; and
- assert any right to relief arising out of the same event,
transaction, or series of events or transactions.
Each Respondent is required to defend against only those claims
for relief that are directed at that Respondent. Each Respondent
may have an award issued against them based on their individual
liability.
(c) Upon request of a party, the Director may make an initial
determination to consolidate separate but related claims into one
arbitration. After all pleadings are filed, if any party objects to the
consolidation of the claims, the Director will make an initial
determination whether the parties should proceed in the same or
separate arbitration.
(d) Upon the request of a party, the Director's decision with respect to
consolidating claims is subject to review by the arbitrators. The
arbitrator(s) makes all final decisions regarding joining and
consolidating multiple parties and claims.
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Section 9. Simplified Arbitration
This section applies only to claims involving customers where damages
of $25,000 or less are claimed.
(a) Qualifying Claims.
Simplified arbitration only applies to claims involving customers
where the dollar amount of the claim is $25,000 or less, not
including costs and interest.
(b) How to Start a Claim.
A Claimant must submit the following documents to the Director,
with copies for each party and arbitrator:
- a signed and notarized Submission Agreement;
- a Statement of Claim, specifying relevant facts, remedies
requested and whether a hearing is requested;
- additional documents supporting the claim; and
- the non-refundable filing fee and required deposit, specified in
Section 11.
Upon receipt, the Director will promptly send each Respondent a
copy of the Submission Agreement and Statement of Claim.
(c) Answer and Counterclaim Requirements.
(1) Within 20 days of receipt of the Statement of Claim, the
Respondent(s) must send each party a signed and notarized
Submission Agreement and an Answer. At the same time, the
Respondent must file additional copies of the signed
Submission Agreement and Answer with the Director with
additional copies for the arbitrator.
(2) A Respondent's Answer must include all available defenses.
The Answer may also include any related counterclaims and/or
third-party claims. If a counterclaim or third-party claim is
asserted, the Respondent must submit to the Director the non-
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refundable filing fee and required deposit specified in Section
11.
(3) The Claimant must send a reply to any counterclaim to each
party within 10 days of receipt of the counterclaim. However,
if the amount of the counterclaim exceeds the original claim,
the Claimant may withdraw the original claim and discontinue
the proceeding. After withdrawal, either party may refile their
claim to initiate a new proceeding.
(4) If the Respondent asserts a third-party claim, the Respondent
must serve on the Third-Party Respondent:
- a signed and notarized Submission Agreement,
- the Third Party Claim, and
- the original Statement of Claim and Answer.
A Third-Party Respondent must respond as if answering an
original Statement of Claim.
(5) If a counterclaim exceeds $25,000, not including costs and
interest, the arbitrator may:
- refer the entire case to a panel of 3 arbitrators for resolution
pursuant to the procedures in general arbitration; or
- dismiss the counterclaim or the third-party claim, and allow
it to be re-filed in a separate arbitration.
Costs to a customer may not exceed the amount specified in
Section 11.
(d) Documents to be Served on All Parties and Filed with the Director
of Arbitration.
Where applicable, all parties must send a copy of the following
documents to all other parties and to the Director, with copies for
the arbitrator:
- the Answer;
- any Counterclaim;
- any Third-Party Claim;
- any Amended Claim; and
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- any other pleading.
(e) Time Extensions.
The Director may grant extensions of time to file any pleading for
good cause.
(f) The Arbitrator Deciding the Claim.
(1) The claim will be submitted to a single arbitrator
knowledgeable in the securities industry, selected as described
in Section 17. The arbitrator will decide the claim on the
evidence and pleadings filed by the parties unless the customer
requests or consents to a hearing, or the arbitrator calls a
hearing. If a hearing will be held, the Director will select the
hearing location and schedule the hearing date as soon as
possible.
(2) The arbitrator deciding the claim may request the appointment
of two additional arbitrators. Where there is more than one
arbitrator, the majority of the arbitrators will be public
arbitrators as defined in Section 16.
(g) Document Production.
(1)If there is a hearing, Sections 15 and 23 will govern information
exchange and pre-hearing activity.
(2) If a hearing will not be held, the parties must make all requests
for documents in writing within 10 business days of notice of
the arbitrator's appointment. A request must be sent at the
same time to all parties and filed with the Director.
(3) Parties must respond or object to the requests in writing, with
copies to all parties, within 5 business days, and file a copy
with the Director. The arbitrator will resolve objections on the
papers submitted without a hearing.
(h) Additional Documents.
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(1) With the permission of the arbitrator the parties may submit
additional documents relating to the pleadings.
(2) Upon the request of a party or at the discretion of the
arbitrator(s), the arbitrator(s) may order the submission of
additional documentation relating to the pleadings.
(i) General Arbitration Rules.
The general arbitration rules of the [SRO] apply to Simplified
Arbitration, unless otherwise specified.
Section 10. The Arbitration Hearing
This section deals with the scheduling of the Arbitration Hearing, how
parties may waive a hearing, and postponement of a scheduled hearing
date.
(a) Time and Place of Hearings.
(1) The Director decides when and where to hold the initial
hearing. The Director must give notice of the time and place
of the initial hearing to each party at least 15 business days
before the hearing. Notice will be sent by personal service, or
registered or certified mail, unless the parties waive notice.
(2) The arbitrator(s) decide when and where to hold subsequent
hearings, and how to notify the parties of those hearings.
(3) A party attending a hearing waives the right to object to lack of
notice of that hearing.
(b) Waiver of the Hearing Requirement.
(1) A hearing will be held in every claim unless:
- The SRO is processing the case as a Simplified Arbitration;
or
- All parties waive a hearing, in writing, and request a
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decision by the arbitrators based upon the pleadings and
documentary evidence alone.
(2) Even if the parties waive the hearing, a majority of the
arbitrators may call for a hearing. Also, any arbitrator may
request that further evidence be provided.
(c) Postponements.
A postponement is any delay or cancellation of a hearing date.
This section covers how to request a postponement of the hearing
date and describes the costs and possible consequences of such
postponements.
(1) Arbitrators may postpone hearings on their own, or at the
request of any party.
(2) Unless waived by the Director, a party that requests a
postponement after arbitrators have been appointed must:
- for the first request, deposit a fee equal to the initial hearing
session deposit.
- for the second and any subsequent requests, deposit an
amount equal to twice the initial hearing session deposit, but
not over $1,000. If the arbitrators do not grant a
postponement, any postponement fees paid will be refunded.
The arbitrators may also direct the refund of a postponement
fee if a postponement is granted.
(3) If the arbitrators receive a third request for postponement that
is consented to by all parties, the arbitrators may dismiss the
arbitration. A claimant, however, may later file a new
arbitration on the same claim.
Section 11. Schedule of Fees
All claims require that the filing party must pay a filing fee and hearing
session deposit. This section also covers the amount of fees required
and describes how the arbitrators may assess fees.
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(a) Filing Fees and Hearing Session Deposits.
(1) When filing a Claim, Counterclaim, Third-Party Claim, or
Cross-Claim, that party must pay a non-refundable filing fee
and a hearing session deposit to the SRO, as indicated in the
fee schedules below, unless waived by the Director.
(2) When multiple hearing sessions are scheduled, the arbitrators
may require any party to make additional hearing session
deposits. The sum of the hearing session deposits shall not
exceed the amount of the largest initial hearing session deposit
times the number of scheduled hearing sessions.
(b) Hearing Session Defined.
A hearing session is any meeting between the parties and the
arbitrators, including a pre-hearing conference, which lasts 4 hours
or less. The fee for a pre-hearing conference with one arbitrator is
the same as the hearing session deposit for one arbitrator.
(c) Forum Fees.
(1) General assessment of forum fees. Forum fees are charges
assessed against one or more of the parties for the hearing. The
arbitrators, in their award, will decide the forum fee amount
chargeable to the parties, and determine who must pay such
fees. Forum fees will be assessed based upon the number of
hearing sessions. The total forum fees for each hearing session
may not exceed the amount of the largest initial hearing
deposit of any party, except when claims are joined after
filing. Forum fees for claims joined after filing are provided in
paragraph (d). The arbitrators may decide that a party will
reimburse another party for non-refundable filing fees.
(2) Customer fees for an industry claim. In an industry claim, the
arbitrators may assess forum fees against the customer. In
such case, the arbitrators will base their assessment on the
hearing deposit for the amount actually awarded to the
industry party, rather than the amount of the industry claim.
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If an industry claim against a customer is dismissed, the
arbitrators may not assess fees against a customer. However,
if the case also involves a customer claim, the arbitrators may
assess fees against the customer based upon the schedule of
fees for customer claims.
(3) Application of Deposits. A party's deposits will be applied
against forum fees assessed against that party, if any. The
Director will refund a party's hearing deposit if forum fees are
not assessed against that party, unless the arbitrators direct
otherwise.
(4) Other costs. The arbitrators may also determine, and state in
the award, the amount of costs incurred, including costs
incurred under Sections 10(c) (Postponements), 15
(Information Exchange and Pre-Hearing Proceeding), and
25(d) (Record of Proceedings). The arbitrators will determine
other costs and expenses of the parties and arbitrators that are
within the scope of the agreement of the parties unless
applicable law directs otherwise. The arbitrators will decide
who will pay those costs.
(d) Joined or Consolidated Claims.
For claims filed separately and subsequently joined or
consolidated, the arbitrators will base the hearing deposits and
forum fees on the total amount in dispute. The arbitrators will
decide who will pay those fees.
(e) Non-monetary Claims.
If the claim does not involve or specify a money claim, the non-
refundable filing fee for a customer or non-member is $250 and the
non-refundable filing fee for an industry party is $500. The hearing
session deposit is $600 or an amount determined by the Director or
the panel of arbitrators which will not exceed $1,000.
(f) Claims Settled or Withdrawn Prior to the Initial Hearing.
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The SRO will retain all hearing session deposits submitted by the
parties in any matter settled or withdrawn within eight business
days of the first scheduled hearing session other than a pre-hearing
conference.
(g) Claims Settled or Withdrawn After the Initial Hearing.
The arbitrators may assess forum fees and any costs incurred for
any matter settled or withdrawn after the beginning of the first
hearing session, including a pre-hearing conference with an
arbitrator. The arbitrators will base the fees on hearing sessions
held or scheduled within eight business days after the SRO received
notice that the matter is settled or withdrawn. The arbitrators must
decide who will pay the forum fees and costs.
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Schedule of Fees
For the purposes of the schedule of fees the term "claim" includes
claims, counterclaims, cross claims, and third party claims. Any such
"claim" made by a customer is a customer claim. Any such "claim"
made by a member or associated person of a member is an industry
claim.
SCHEDULE OF FEES
Amount in Dispute
$.01-$1,000
$1,000.01-$2,500
$2,500.01-$5,000
$5,000.01 -$10,000
$10,000.01-$25,000
$25,000.01-$50,000
$50,000.01-$100,00
$100,000.01-$500,000
$500,000.01-$5,000,000
Over $5,000,000
CUSTOMER CLAIMANT
Filing Fee Hearing Session Deposit
Paper 1 Arbitrator 3 Arbitrators
$ 15 $15 $ 15 N/A
$ 25 $25 $ 25 N/A
$ 50
$ 75
$100
$120
$150
$200
$250
$300
$75
$75
$100
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$100
$200
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
N/A
N/A
$400
$400
$500
$750
$1,000
$1,500
INDUSTRY
Filing Fee
Amount in Dispute
$.01-$1,000
$1,000.01-$2,500
$2,500.01-$5,000
$5,000.01-$10,000
$10,000.01-$25,000
$25,000.01-$50,000
$50,000.01-$100,000
$100,000.01-$500,000
$500,000.01-$5,000,000
Over $5,000,000
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
$500
CLAIMANT
Hearing Session Deposit
Paper 1 Arbitrator 3 Arbitrators
$75
$75
$75
$75
$100
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$300
$600
$600
$600
$750
$1,000
$1,500
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Section 12. Determining time limits on eligibility of a claim and how
to challenge a claim's eligibility for arbitration
This section describes which claims may not be eligible for arbitration
because of the passage of time. It also describes how the claim's
eligibility will be reviewed and decided by the Director.
(a) Time Limits on Eligibility.
(1) At any party's request, the Director shall find a claim not
eligible for arbitration if six years have passed between the
time of filing and the event giving rise to the dispute, claim or
controversy.
(2) An allegation of fraudulent concealment does not make an
otherwise ineligible claim eligible. However, arbitrators may
consider fraudulent concealment in connection with any other
defense to the claim based on lapse of time (e.g., statute of
limitations).
(3) If more than six years have passed since the event that is the
subject of the claim, damages are not recoverable in
arbitration. However, the Claimant may proceed in court with
such claim.
(b) Defining the Event Causing the Controversy.
"Event" means the trade date for the security on which the claim is
based. If the claim is not based on a trade, event means the date
that the responding party acted (or failed to act), creating the
controversy that is the subject of the claim.
(c) How to Challenge Eligibility.
(1) The party challenging the eligibility of the claim must:
- have a good faith basis to allege that the claim is not eligible
for arbitration; and
- within 20 business days of service of the claim, request in
writing a ruling on the claim's eligibility from the Director.
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(2) The party opposing the challenge to eligibility may respond in
writing to the Director within 10 business days after service of
the challenge. Such a challenge extends the deadline for filing
an answer until 20 business days after receipt of the Director's
decision on eligibility.
(3) The Director will decide the issue of eligibility and attempt to
notify the parties of the decision within 30 days of the
challenge. This decision is final for purposes of court
jurisdiction.
(4) Any party may dispute the decision of the Director by filing an
action in a court within 20 business days after receipt of the
Director's decision. A party who disputes the Director's
decision that a claim is eligible is admitting that the claim is
not eligible for arbitration, and the opposing party may then
immediately file a claim in court as allowed in Section 12(d).
(5) If no action is filed in court within the 20 business days after
receipt of the Director's decision, the decision is final and may
not be subsequently challenged in any forum. If an action is
filed challenging the Director's decision, then the filing date of
any answer or other pleading in the arbitration will be
extended until 20 business days after the court action is finally
resolved.
(6) No party shall submit the issue of eligibility to a court prior to
the submission of the issue to the Director, or once submitted,
prior to the Director's decision.
(d) Claims Not Eligible for Arbitration.
(1) If the Director decides that a claim is not eligible, any party
may file the claim in court as if no arbitration agreement
existed between the parties, even though a submission
agreement has been filed.
(2) If permitted under applicable law and/or Section 5, when
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eligibility is contested, the time limits that would ordinarily
run for filing a claim in court will be tolled (e.g., statute of
limitations and repose). This tolling will continue from the
filing of an arbitration claim until 20 business days after
service of the Director's decision on eligibility.
(e) Statute of Limitations (Time Limits).
(1) This section does not extend or limit any statutes of limitations.
(2) If a party files a claim in court and the party against whom the
claim is brought requests the court to order arbitration, that
party may not later challenge the eligibility of the claim to be
arbitrated.
Section 13. Amendments
(a) If a party wants to file a new or different pleading that party must:
- file the new or different pleading in writing with the Director,
with copies for each arbitrator; and
- serve all other parties with a copy.
Other parties may file a response within 10 business days of
receipt of the new or different pleading. Parties must send their
response to all other parties and the Director, with copies for each
arbitrator.
(b) Parties serving new or different pleadings or responses under this
section must follow Section 6 (Service and Filing Requirements).
(c) Parties may not file new or different pleadings after the panel of
arbitrators is appointed without the panel's consent. Parties may,
however, respond to a pleading that was filed before the panel's
appointment.
Section 14. Settlements
Parties to an arbitration may agree to settle their dispute at any time.
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Section 15. Exchange of Documents and Information
This section covers the documents and information that the parties must
provide to each other before the hearing.
(a) General Rules.
(1) Parties must cooperate by voluntarily exchanging documents
and information to expedite the arbitration.
(2) Requests for documents and information must be specific,
relate to the controversy, and allow the responding party a
reasonable time to respond without interfering with the hearing
date.
(b) Requests for Documents and Information.
(1) A party may request in writing documents and information
from another party the earlier of:
- 20 business days after service of the Statement of Claim by
the Director; or
- upon filing of the Answer.
(2) The party requesting information must serve copies of the
request upon all parties.
(c) Complying or Objecting.
(1) A party who receives a document and information request must
satisfy or object to the request within 30 days from service of
the request. The requesting party may allow a greater time to
respond to the request.
(2) Before formally objecting to a document and information
request, parties must try to resolve disputes among themselves.
The objecting party must describe those efforts in the written
objection.
(3) Any party who objects to a document and information request
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must serve the objection on all parties.
(4) Within 10 days of receipt of the objection, a party may serve a
response to the objection on all parties.
(5) If a party does not receive the requested documents and
information, upon written request, the Director will refer the
matter to either a pre-hearing conference or to a selected
arbitrator (See Section 23). Copies of the request, objections
to the request and response to the objection, if any, must
accompany the request to the Director of Arbitration.
Sections 15(c) (3)&(4) amended October 2, 2003
Section 16. Determining the Number and Type of Arbitrators
This section covers the number and type of arbitrators who will decide a
claim with a customer or a non-member as a party, when the amount in
dispute exceeds $25,000. For claims of $25,000 or less involving
customers or non-members, see Section 9 (Simplified Arbitration).
(a) For claims of $25,001 to $100,000.
If any party is a customer or a non-member and the total amount
claimed in the case is from $25,001 to $100,000 (excluding costs
and interest):
(1) One arbitrator, classified as public and knowledgeable in the
securities industry, will hear the case unless any party or the
arbitrator asks for three arbitrators.
(2) If a party requests three arbitrators, the request must be made
when that party files its first documents (Statement of Claim or
Answer) with the SRO. The requesting party must pay an
additional hearing session deposit for three arbitrators when it
makes its request.
(3) If three arbitrators are requested, two will be classified as
public arbitrators, unless the customer or non-member requests
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that the panel includes two or three arbitrators classified as
being from the securities industry.
(4) The customer or non-member must ask for two or three
arbitrators classified as being from the securities industry
within ten days after the answer is due. This deadline is not
extended even if an extension is granted for an answer.
(b) Claims above $100,000 or where no dollar amount is claimed or
disclosed.
Three arbitrators will hear and decide claims above $100,000 (not
including costs and interest) or where no dollar amount is claimed
or disclosed.
(1) Two of the three arbitrators will be classified as public
arbitrators, unless the customer or non-member requests' that
the panel includes two or three arbitrators classified as being
from the securities industry.
(2) A request for two or three arbitrators classified as being from
the securities industry must be made within 10 days after the
answer is due. This deadline is not extended even if an
extension is granted for an answer.
(c) How Securities Industry Arbitrators Are Classified.
If the parties select arbitrators from the SRO's pool, there are two
types of arbitrators who may hear the case. Arbitrators are
classified as either securities industry or public arbitrators.
An arbitrator is classified as being from the securities industry if
that arbitrator:
(1) is or is associated with either:
- a member of an SRO
- a securities broker/dealer
- a government securities broker
- a government securities dealer
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- a municipal securities dealer
- a member of a registered futures association or any
commodity exchange
- a person registered under the Commodity Exchange Act; or
(2) has been associated with any of the above within the last five
years; or
(3) has retired from or spent a substantial part of a career with any
of the above; or
(4) is an attorney, accountant, or other professional who within the
last two years devoted 20 percent or more of his or her time to
any person or entities enumerated in (c)(1).
(d) How Public Arbitrators are Classified.
(1) A public arbitrator is anyone in the SRO's pool of arbitrators
who is not classified as a securities industry arbitrator.
(2) A person will not be classified as a public arbitrator if:
- a spouse or member of the household could be classified as a
securities industry arbitrator under paragraph (c)(1) of this
section.
- The person has been associated with the industry as defined
in paragraph (c)(1) of this section
- The person is an investment advisor
- The person is an attorney, accountant or other professional
whose firm derives 20 percent or more of its annual income
from securities industry representation.
In addition, a person will not be classified as a public arbitrator
if a spouse or member of the household is employed by a bank
or financial institution, and:
- effects transactions in securities, or
- supervises employees who effect transactions in securities,
or
- monitors compliance with the securities laws of the
employees who effect transactions in securities.
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(e) Who will not be classified as a securities industry arbitrator or a
public arbitrator.
(1) A person will not be classified as a securities industry or a
public arbitrator if the person is employed by a bank or
financial institution and:
- effects transactions in securities, or
- supervises employees who effect transactions in securities,
or
- monitors compliance with the securities laws of the
employees who effect transactions in securities.
(2) A person will not be classified as a securities industry or a
public arbitrator if the (SRO) believes the person may not
qualify as an arbitrator.
Section 16(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) & (d)(2) amended June 7, 2002
Sections 16(c)(4) & (d)(2) amended April 9, 2003
Sections 16(a) & (b) amended March 22, 2004
Section 17. Selecting Arbitrators
(a) Sources of Arbitrators.
(1) The (SRO) will provide lists of potential arbitrators to the
parties. If every party, however, agrees, they may jointly
select arbitrators whether or not on the SRO's list.
(2) The Director will designate the chair for each panel unless all
the parties agree to a chair.
(b) Lists of Potential Arbitrators and Background Information.
(1) If one arbitrator hears a case, the Director will send each party
a list of public arbitrators.
(2) If three arbitrators hear a case, the Director will send each
party two lists, one of public arbitrators and one of securities
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industry arbitrators.
(3) The Director will send the list(s) to the parties within 30 days
after the answer to the initial claim is due. If however, the
answer is filed on time and contains a third party claim, the
list(s) will be sent within 30 days from the time the answer to
the third party claim is due.
(4) Along with the list(s), the parties will also receive the
employment histories of the listed arbitrators for the past 10
years and any information disclosed under Section 19
(Arbitrator's Required Disclosure).
(5) Any party may ask the Director for additional information
about the background of a potential arbitrator.
The request for additional information must be made within
the twenty days the party has to return the list(s) as provided in
Section 17(c). The [SRO] shall obtain the information from
the arbitrator without advising the arbitrator which party
requested the information and shall send the arbitrator's
response to all parties at the same time. The Director in
his/her discretion may limit the additional information
requested from the arbitrator.
The request for more information will toll the time for
returning the list(s) to the Director. The tolling period shall
commence from the date the request for additional information
is received by the [SRO] to the date a response to the
additional information requested is received. The Director
may extend the deadline for requesting additional information
and returning the list(s) if the Director finds a reasonable basis
for this extension.
(c) Return of lists.
(1) The parties must return their list(s) to the Director within 20
days of the date they receive it, or as extended by the parties'
use of the tolling period. A party must:
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- Strike through the names of any unacceptable arbitrators on
each list. A party's strikes are limited as explained in
Section 18 (Objecting to Potential Arbitrators); and
- Rank the remaining names on each list in order of
preference, with "1" being the arbitrator you most strongly
prefer.
(2) A party accepts all arbitrators on the lists(s) when they do not
return the lists on time.
(3) The SRO will ask arbitrators to serve in the order of the
parties' mutual preferences. Mutual preferences are
determined for each classification of arbitrator by adding
together the numbers assigned to each arbitrator and selecting
arbitrators with the lowest numbers first.
(d) Appointment of Arbitrators.
The Director will appoint one or more arbitrators for the panel
from the SRO's pool of arbitrators if:
- the parties do not agree on a complete panel;
- acceptable arbitrators are unable to serve; or
- arbitrators cannot be found from the lists for any other reason.
In the event the Director's appointment becomes necessary, then
each side will be given one peremptory strike per case.
Section 17 amended March 15, 2005 (added last paragraph)
Section 18. Challenging Potential Arbitrators
This section deals with striking unacceptable arbitrators and ranking
those that are acceptable. Arbitrators may also be challenged for cause.
(a) Peremptory strikes.
(1) If one arbitrator hears a case, a party may strike any or all of
the names from the list without providing an explanation. This
is called a peremptory strike. In the event the forum cannot
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select the arbitrator from the names not stricken, then a second
list will be submitted to the parties. The second list will
contain three names. Each side shall be given one peremptory
strike from that list.
(2) If three arbitrators hear a case, a party may strike any or all of
the names from the lists. In the event the forum cannot select
the arbitrators from the names not stricken, then a second list
will be submitted to the parties. The second list will contain
three names for each vacancy to fill out the panel. Each side
shall be given one strike per vacancy from the list without
providing an explanation.
(3) In cases where there are two or more people making a claim or
responding to a claim, all the people making the claim will
share one set of peremptory strikes and all the people
responding to the claim will share one set of peremptory
strikes. If a claim is made against two or more third parties,
the third parties will share one set of peremptory strikes.
(4) Section 17 (Selecting Arbitrators) provides the deadlines for
exercising peremptory strikes.
(5) The Director may allow additional peremptory strikes if the
Director determines that justice would be served by doing so.
(b) Challenges for Cause.
The parties have an unlimited number of challenges for cause. The
Director will determine whether to remove an arbitrator because of a
challenge for cause.
A challenge for cause to a particular arbitrator will be granted where it is
reasonable to infer an absence of impartiality, the presence of bias, or
the existence of some interest on the part of the arbitrator in the outcome
of the arbitration as it affects one of the parties. The interest or bias
must be direct, definite, and capable of reasonable demonstration, rather
than remote or speculative.
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Section 18(b) amended January 13, 2003
Section 19. Arbitrator's Required Disclosures
(a) Disclosures Generally.
Before accepting appointment, each arbitrator must disclose to the
Director any circumstances that might preclude the arbitrator from
rendering an objective and impartial decision, including:
(1) any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the result
of the arbitration;
(2) any past or present financial, business, professional, family,
social or other relationships between:
- themselves, their immediate families or household members,
their employers and their professional or business associates,
and
- the parties, their attorneys, and witnesses;
(3) any relationship that might reasonably create the appearance of
partiality or bias; and
(4) the nature and extent of any prior knowledge the arbitrator may
have of the dispute.
(b) Duty to Investigate.
Arbitrators must make a reasonable effort to investigate all
relationships described in paragraph (a) above.
(c) Continuing Duty to Disclose.
An arbitrator must disclose any circumstances described in
paragraph (a) above as they arise, are discovered, or recalled,
throughout the arbitration.
(d) Arbitrator Removal and Disclosure.
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(1) The Director may remove an arbitrator, before the first pre-
hearing or hearing session, based on the disclosure of
information described above. The Director will remove or will
disqualify from appointment any arbitrator who the director
concludes intentionally has failed to disclose material
information as to his or her background, experience or
potential or existing conflicts of interest or bias.
(2) The Director will inform the parties of any information
disclosed under this section if the arbitrator is not removed.
(3) Once the hearings have commenced, the Director may remove
an arbitrator based only on information required to be
disclosed under subsection (a), not known to the parties when
the arbitrator was selected. The Director's authority under this
subsection may not be delegated.
Sections 19(a)(2) and 19(c) amended: March 14,2000
Section 19(d)(3) added March 14, 2000
Section 19(d)((1) amended June 23, 2005
Section 20. Filling Vacancies of Arbitrators
(a) Filling vacancies before the first hearing.
(1) If an arbitrator must withdraw before the first hearing, the
Director will invite the next acceptable arbitrator on the
parties' list(s) of arbitrators to fill the vacancy. If there are no
remaining names, or if the vacancy cannot be filled from the
names on the lists, the Director will appoint an arbitrator.
The parties will receive:
- The arbitrator's name and employment history for the last 10
years, and
- Any information disclosed under Section 19 (Arbitrator's
Required Disclosure).
(2) Any party may ask the Director for additional information on
the proposed arbitrator's background. Any party may
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challenge the arbitrator as provided in Section 18 (Objecting to
Potential Arbitrators).
(b) Filling Vacancies After The First Hearing Starts.
(1) If an arbitrator cannot serve after the start of the first hearing,
the case may continue with the remaining arbitrators unless
any party objects. If any party objects, that party must advise
the Director on whichever occurs earlier:
- Within 5 days of receiving notice of the vacancy, or
- Before the next scheduled hearing session.
(2) If any party objects to continuing without a full panel, the
Director will fill the vacancy from the remaining names on the
parties' lists of acceptable arbitrators. If there are no
remaining names, or if the vacancy cannot be filled from the
names on the lists, the Director will appoint an arbitrator.
(3) When the Director appoints a replacement arbitrator, the
parties will receive the following as soon as possible:
- The arbitrator's name and employment history for the last 10
years, and
- Any information disclosed under Section 19 (Arbitrator's
Required Disclosure).
(4) Any party may ask the Director for additional information on
the appointed arbitrator's background. Any party may
challenge the arbitrator as provided in Section 18 (Objecting to
Potential Arbitrators).
Section 21. Arbitrator Rulings
(a) Oaths of the Arbitrators.
Arbitrators will take an oath or affirmation before the first pre-
hearing or hearing session begins or before issuing any ruling.
(b) Majority Agreement Requirement.
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The arbitrators will make any ruling or determination by a
majority vote, except as provided under Section 23 (Pre-Hearing
Procedures).
(c) Interpretation and Enforcement of Arbitrator Rulings.
The arbitrators may interpret and enforce all provisions of this
Code, except for the provision regarding the eligibility of claims
for arbitration (see Section 12). Arbitrators also may take
appropriate action to obtain compliance with their rulings,
including imposing penalties (see Section 22). Arbitrators'
interpretations and actions to obtain compliance are final and
binding upon the parties.
Section 22. When Proceedings May be Dismissed
(a) Any time during an arbitration, the arbitrators may, either upon
their own initiative or at the request of a party, dismiss the
proceeding and refer the parties to their judicial remedies or any
other dispute resolution forum agreed to by the parties. Any such
referral shall be without prejudice to any claims or defense.
(b) Arbitrators may dismiss a claim or a defense with prejudice when:
- a party intentionally fails to comply with an arbitrator's order;
and
- lesser penalties have not produced compliance.
(c) The arbitrators will dismiss the proceedings when requested to do
so by all parties.
Section 23. Pre-Hearing Proceedings
This section covers the procedures to be followed to resolve disputes
over the exchange of documents and information before the hearing.
(a) Pre-Hearing Conference.
(1) The Director will schedule a pre-hearing conference at the
written request of a party, or an arbitrator. The Director may
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also schedule a pre-hearing conference at his or her own
discretion.
(2) The Director will decide where and when to hold a pre-hearing
conference, and appoint a person to preside over it. The
conference may be held by telephone.
(3) The presiding person will seek to achieve agreement among
the parties on:
- pre-hearing information and document exchange;
- witness lists;
- stipulations of facts;
- identification and briefing of contested issues; and
- any other matter that will expedite the arbitration.
(4) The Director may refer any unresolved issues from the pre-
hearing conference to a member of the Arbitration Panel for
decision.
(b) Decisions by a Single Arbitrator on Pre-hearing Issues.
The Director may appoint a member of the Arbitration Panel to
decide all unresolved pre-hearing issues on behalf of the panel.
The arbitrator may:
- issue subpoenas for witnesses or documents;
- direct appearances of witnesses;
- direct production of documents; and
- set deadlines for document or witnesses production.
The arbitrator will decide issues under this section based on the
papers submitted by the parties, or may call for a hearing. The
arbitrator may refer any issues to the full panel for decision.
(c) Subpoenas.
(1) Arbitrators and any counsel of record may issue subpoenas as
provided by law. The party who requests or issues a subpoena
must send a copy of the request or subpoena to all parties and
the entity receiving the subpoena in a manner that is
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reasonably expected to cause the request or subpoena to be
delivered to all parties and the entity receiving the subpoena
on the same day. The parties will produce witnesses and
present proof at the hearing whenever possible without using
subpoenas.
(2) No subpoenas seeking discovery shall be issued to or served
upon non-parties to an arbitration unless, at least 10 days prior
to the issuance or service of the subpoena, the party seeking to
issue or serve the subpoena sends notice of intention to serve
the subpoena, together with a copy of the subpoena, to all
parties to the arbitration.
(3) In the event a party receiving such a notice objects to the scope
or propriety of the subpoena, that party shall, within the 10
days prior to the issuance or service of the subpoena, file with
the Director, with copies to all other parties, written
objections. The party seeking to issue or serve the subpoena
may respond thereto. The arbitrator appointed pursuant to this
Code shall rule promptly on the issuance and scope of the
subpoena.
(4) In the event an objection to a subpoena is filed under paragraph
(c)(3), the subpoena may only be issued or served prior to the
arbitrator's ruling if the party seeking to issue or serve the
subpoena advises the subpoenaed party of the existence of the
objection at the time the subpoena is served, and instructs the
subpoenaed party that it should preserve the subpoenaed
documents, but not deliver them until a ruling is made by the
arbitrator.
(5) Rule 23(c)(2) and (3) do not apply to subpoenas addressed to
parties or non-parties to appear at a hearing before the
arbitrators.
(6) The arbitrator(s) shall have the power to quash or limit the
scope of any subpoena.
(d) Power to Direct Appearance and Production of Documents.
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Arbitrators may, without using subpoenas, direct:
- the appearance of any employee or associated person of a
member or member organization of the SRO; and
- the production of any records in the possession or control of
persons or members.
The party requesting the appearance or document production will
pay reasonable costs related to the request unless the arbitrator
directs otherwise.
(e) Joint Administration.
(1) At the request of any of the parties to an arbitration or of any
member of the panel, the arbitrators may consider whether
they should jointly administer all subsequent proceedings in
the arbitration.
(2) If the arbitrators and all parties agree, then the arbitrators may,
without the assistance of the SRO, schedule all pre-hearing
and hearing dates, the timing of the service and filing of
appropriate papers, all discovery matters and all other matters
relevant to the expeditious handling of the case.
(3) This Rule shall only apply to those matters where all parties
are represented by counsel. If, during the proceeding a party
chooses to appear pro se, this Rule shall no longer apply.
(4) Transmittal of Documents and Procedure for Oral
Communications
(a) Parties may send written materials directly to the
arbitrators, provided that copies of all such materials are
sent simultaneously and in the same manner to all parties
and the Director. The parties shall send the Director,
arbitrators, and all parties proof of service of such written
materials, indicating the time, date, and manner of service
upon the arbitrators and all parties. Service by mail is
completed upon mailing. If the arbitrators and all parties
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agree, written materials may be served electronically.
(b) If the arbitrators agree, the parties may initiate conference
calls with the arbitrators, provided that all parties are on
the line before the arbitrators join the call. Such
conference calls may be tape-recorded or
stenographically recorded.
(c) The arbitrators may initiate conference calls with the
parties, provided all parties are on the line before the
conference begins. Such conference calls may be tape
recorded or stenographically recorded.
(d) Parties may not communicate orally with the arbitrators
unless all parties are present.
The arbitrators are empowered to terminate or modify any order they
issue regarding the joint administration of the arbitration.
Section 23(e) added October 2, 2002
Section 23(c) amended June 12, 2003
Section 23(c) amended April 29, 2004
Section 23(c) amended October 20, 2004
Section 24. Pre-Hearing Exchange of Documents and Witness Lists
This section deals with the requirement of the parties to exchange
documents and names of witnesses with each other before the hearing.
(a) All parties must serve on each other, no later than 20 days before
the first scheduled hearing, copies of documents in their
possession and the names of witnesses they intend to present at the
hearing. Witnesses are to be identified by name, address, and
business affiliation.
(b) Parties may provide a list of documents, rather than copies of the
documents, if they have previously produced the documents to the
other parties.
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(c) All parties must serve on the Director, at the same time and in the
same manner as service on other parties:
- a list of documents they have produced to other parties; and
- their witness lists.
(d) The arbitrators may exclude from consideration documents not
exchanged and witnesses not identified as required under this
section.
(e) Parties are not required to serve copies of documents or names of
witnesses that they may use for cross examination or rebuttal.
Section 25. Hearing Procedures
This section covers the procedures that will be followed at a hearing.
(a) Who May Attend Hearings.
The arbitrators will decide who may be present at the hearings.
The parties and their attorneys are always entitled to attend
hearings.
(b) Oaths of Witnesses.
All witnesses will testify under oath or affirmation.
(c) Acknowledgment of Pleadings.
Arbitrators will acknowledge at the hearing that they have read the
pleadings.
(d) Recording the Proceedings.
All arbitration hearings will be recorded verbatim by stenographic
reporter or tape recording. Any party may request that the record
be transcribed. A party requesting a transcript will bear the cost,
unless the arbitrators direct otherwise. If the record is transcribed,
the parties will provide the arbitrators with a copy of the transcript.
The arbitrators may also direct that the record be transcribed.
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(e) Evidence.
The arbitrators decide if evidence is material or relevant, and are
not required to follow the rules governing whether evidence is
admissible.
(f) Failure to Appear at a Hearing.
If a party, after receiving notice of a hearing, does not attend the
hearing or its continuation, the arbitrators may proceed in their
discretion; and make an award as if each party had entered an
appearance in the arbitration.
Section 26. Reopening of Hearings Before a Decision is Rendered
Unless prohibited by law, the arbitrators may reopen the hearing before
an award is rendered by application of a party, or on their own initiative.
Section 27. Awards
This section covers the contents of the arbitrators' award, and what
happens after the award is rendered.
(a) The arbitrators may grant any remedy or relief that they deem just
and equitable and that would have been available in any court with
jurisdiction over the matter.
(b) The arbitrators must make all awards in writing, and a majority of
the arbitrators must sign the award. The arbitrators may also make
awards in any other manner required by law. A court may enter a
judgment on any award.
(c) Unless the law directs otherwise, awards made in accordance with
this Code are final and not subject to review or appeal.
(d) The Director will send the parties or their counsel a copy of the
award by one of the following methods:
- facsimile transmission or other electronic means;
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- registered or certified mail to the address of record;
- personal service; or
- any other method of filing or delivery authorized by law.
(e) The arbitrators will attempt to render their award within 30
business days after the record is closed.
(f) The award will contain the following:
- names of the parties;
- names of counsel, if any;
- summary of the issues in controversy;
- type of security or product in controversy;
- damages and/or other relief requested;
- damages and/or other relief awarded;
- statement of any other issues resolved;
- names of the arbitrators; and
- signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the award.
(g) The SRO will make the awards publicly available, in accordance
with its policies.
(h) (1) A party must pay any monetary relief awarded within 30 days
of receipt of the award unless any party has filed a motion to
vacate the award in a court.
(2) Monetary relief awarded will bear interest from the date it is
issued if:
- the award is not paid within 30 days of receipt, or;
- a motion to vacate the award was denied, or;
- specified by the arbitrators in the award.
Interest shall be assessed at the legal rate then prevailing in the state
where the award was rendered, or at a rate set by the arbitrators.
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APPENDIX B: SRO COMPOSITE ARBITRATION STATISTICS
COMPOSITE ARBITRATION FIGURES
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 830 332 686 269 410 205
1981 1034 302 978 356 526 263
1982 1319 305 1017 282 544 285
1983 1737 421 1260 319 620 328
1984 2464 561 1777 493 739 367
1985 2788 664 2204 523 988 525
1986 2837 660 2453 618 1013 508
1987 4357 836 2964 649 1158 638
1988 6097 1474 3742 936 1559 742
1989 5404 1730 5900 1308 2844 1504
1990 5332 1033 5837 1204 2187 1169
1991 5869 1063 5857 971 1994 1033
1992 5451 925 5778 891 1965 1002
1993 6562 1088 5363 922 1617 853
1994 6531 1116 5580 882 1367 643
1995 7271 1163 6787 1382 1818 919
1996 6510 938 7405 1272 2014 1048
1997 6665 842 6869 840 1652 943
1998 5575 583 6111 684 1704 999
1999 6274 1027 5324 642 1264 750
2000 6156 866 6137 1054 1531 800
2001 7742 687 6070 849 1487 770
2002 9099 667 6701 789 1731 917
2003 10,212 929 8,187 655 1866 990
2004 9,225 1002 10,334 971 2357 1229
2005 6,555 458 10,202 767 1,916 947
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AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 45 18 41 11 35 16
1981 39 7 40 11 42 22
1982 37 9 31 4 16 10
1983 41 14 42 8 10 6
1984 69 16 53 14 41 24
1985 64 21 58 14 45 26
1986 63 20 60 28 31 14
1987 92 34 74 24 41 24
1988 100 21 63 29 27 12
1989 69 26 73 15 26 13
1990 69 21 72 21 25 15
1991 51 15 64 22 25 17
1992 45 12 55 15 23 8
1993 48 11 55 12 15 8
1994 68 13 46 9 10 3
1995 252 86 63 28 14 8
1996 81 49 142 49 8 3
1997 43 18 116 38 8 5
1998 20 2 37 14 7 5
**** AMEX Merged with the NASD
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BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 2 2 2 2 2 0
1981 2 2 2 2 0 0
1982 1 1 1 1 1 1
1983 2 2 2 2 2 1
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 2 2 2 2 2 0
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991 1 0 0 0 0 0
1992 1 0 1 0 0 0
1993 0 0 1 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0
1995 1 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 1 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0
20061
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CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 44 11 31 11 18 6
1981 41 10 32 8 12 3
1982 50 6 38 6 14 3
1983 75 5 45 4 13 6
1984 91 24 56 16 4 3
1985 64 10 38 5 0 0
1986 72 16 44 9 12 9
1987 130 29 93 33 22 9
1988 149 22 89 27 48 12
1989 71 17 105 20 43 14
1990 67 16 85 18 32 16
1991 46 5 62 12 13 9
1992 28 7 28 5 11 5
1993 15 3 18 4 6 2
1994 23 1 24 3 4 1
1995 15 6 26 6 5 0
1996 19 6 10 4 1 0
1997 12 2 18 4 5 2
1998 20 3 18 3 5 3
1999 22 8 22 7 6 2
2000 14 4 17 4 1 0
2001 13 9 4 4 3 0
2002 14 11 2 3 3 2
2003 10 1 15 1 5 0
2004 6 0 9 0 0 0
2005 5 0 7 0 0 0
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CHICAGO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 2 1 2 0 1 1
1981 2 0 2 0 0 0
1982 1 0 0 0 0 0
1983 2 0 2 0 0 0
1984 1 0 0 0 0 0
1985 1 0 0 0 0 0
1986 4 1 0 0 0 0
1987 5 1 3 1 1 1
1988 1 0 7 0 0 0
1989 5 0 6 0 0 0
1990 4 0 3 0 1 1
1991 5 0 2 0 0 0
1992 1 0 2 0 0 0
1993 1 0 0 0 0 0
1994 1 0 1 0 0 0
1995 1 0 0 0 0 0
1996 1 0 1 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 1 0 1 0 0 0
1999 1 0 0 0 0 0
2000 2 0 2 0 0 0
2001 1 0 2 0 0 0
2002 1 0 0 0 0 0
**2003
**2004
**2005
** No Data Received
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MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING BOARD
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 21 7 21 7 3 2
1981 25 5 25 5 7 4
1982 33 7 16 7 13 6
1983 78 17 40 9 14 5
1984 113 20 80 17 34 21
1985 91 31 118 35 54 31
1986 82 30 89 21 30 15
1987 106 38 90 34 42 24
1988 115 49 126 52 63 37
1989 108 41 93 40 50 36
1990 75 41 90 32 40 22
1991 94 35 82 41 38 18
1992 45 12 68 19 31 14
1993 30 15 47 18 34 6
1994 12 3 23 8 11 5
1995 9 1 5 3 1 1
1996 10 1 6 1 5 1
1997 6 2 15 1 9 4
**** The NASD now administers MSRB arbitrations
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NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public*
1980 318 134 234 113 122 56
1981 422 142 422 177 242 118
1982 606 157 435 139 276 140
1983 768 216 549 147 272 161
1984 1,108 298 747 244 381 196
1985 1,400 377 962 250 434 232
1986 1,587 390 1,199 327 476 248
1987 2,886 458 1,625 325 642 364
1988 3,990 1,084 2,169 539 934 432
1989 3,651 1,417 4,050 967 2,097 1,130
1990 3,617 703 4,019 900 1,530 826
1991 4,150 787 4,037 665 1,419 775
1992 4,379 793 4,375 717 1,552 821
1993 5,419 852 4,327 801 1,329 730
1994 5,570 992 4,561 725 1,111 532
1995 6,055 994 5,680 1,159 1,523 788
1996 5,631 849 6,331 1,155 1,815 977
1997 5,997 778 5,880 750 1,497 875
1998 4,938 540 5,484 628 1,573 937
1999 5,608 983 4,767 594 1,148 697
2000 5,558 828 5,473 1,009 1,396 734
2001 6,915 649 5,582 803 1,365 725
2002 7,704 631 5,957 733 1,483 820
2003 8,945 845 7,278 583 1,658 893
2004 8,201 864 9,209 828 2,019 1,113
2005 6,074 370 9,043 655 1,671 851
* "Awards in Favor of Public" column: Relief can include compensatory
damages, punitive damages, interest, all or part of attorneys' fees, all or
part of the filing fees or other costs, and non-monetary awards such as
specific performance or declaratory relief.
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NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 367 131 327 110 221 119
1981 477 117 433 134 214 111
1982 558 109 473 113 214 118
1983 713 136 532 122 276 137
1984 1,008 176 796 183 259 113
1985 1,095 198 962 190 424 221
1986 965 181 1,004 205 432 210
1987 1,050 225 1,000 204 378 200
1988 1,623 263 1,196 235 440 228
1989 1,407 201 1,458 229 527 267
1990 1,378 222 1,466 199 499 256
1991 1,403 187 1,496 199 451 185
1992 873 83 1,166 119 317 137
1993 810 72 837 62 205 92
1994 711 62 795 74 186 80
1995 810 53 784 61 175 74
1996 648 21 783 42 146 49
1997 546 26 695 34 110 48
1998 544 26 528 24 105 47
1999 602 28 507 35 102 45
2000 553 29 604 37 116 55
2001 780 25 462 38 113 42
2002 1,315 25 717 52 239 92
2003 1,241 83 872 71 201 95
2004 1,001 135 1,095 142 335 116
2005 463 86 1,111 106 228 89
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PACIFIC EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 24 12 28 11 4 3
1981 24 17 20 17 9 5
1982 31 15 21 11 10 7
1983 35 17 29 17 23 10
1984 45 21 26 11 10 7
1985 50 12 40 18 20 12
1986 41 9 37 13 18 8
1987 64 27 58 11 23 13
1988 99 30 77 40 45 20
1989 61 19 93 27 86 37
1990 93 25 68 25 45 26
1991 86 21 82 17 33 21
1992 58 16 65 13 27 16
1993 199 130 54 22 23 12
1994 102 37 93 57 38 18
1995 76 15 166 118 79 39
1996 106 10 100 16 36 17
1997 34 13 121 12 21 9
1998 33 7 31 9 11 5
1999 41 8 28 6 8 6
2000 29 5 41 4 18 11
2001 33 4 20 4 6 3
2002 65 0 25 1 6 3
2003 16 0 22 0 2 2
2004 17 3 21 1 3 0
2005 13 2 41 6 17 7
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PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
Total Cases Public
Total Small Concluded Small Customer Awards in
Cases Claims Including Claims Cases Favor of
Year Received Received Settlements Concluded Decided Public
1980 7 16 0 4 4 2
1981 2 2 2 2 0 0
1982 2 1 2 1 0 0
1983 23 14 19 10 10 2
1984 29 6 19 8 10 3
1985 23 15 26 11 11 3
1986 21 11 18 13 12 4
1987 24 24 21 17 9 3
1988 20 5 15 14 2 1
1989 32 9 22 10 15 7
1990 29 5 34 9 15 7
1991 33 13 32 15 15 8
1992 21 2 18 3 4 1
1993 40 5 24 3 5 3
1994 44 8 37 6 7 4
1995 52 8 63 7 21 9
1996 14 2 31 5 3 1
1997 27 3 24 1 2 0
1998 19 5 12 6 3 2
**** Cases administered by the NASD
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APPENDIX C: SRO MEDIATION STATISTICS
SRO Mediation Statistics
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc.
Year Mediations Held
1998 506
1999 461
2000 477
2001 418
2002 523
2003 742
2004 810
2005 668
New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Year Mediations Held
1998 11
1999 51
2000 54
2001 76
2002 157
2003 42
2004 3
2005 6
Composite Mediation Statistics
Year Mediations Held
1998 517
1999 512
2000 531
2001 494
2002 680
2003 784
2004 813
2005 674
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